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Chapter 1
Introduction to the
Dissertation
1
Introduction to the Dissertation
This dissertation is a cumulative thesis comprising of three individual research
articles which contribute to the environmental, development and energy economics
literature. The first two articles underscore how sustainable environmental poli-
cies affect individuals and households’ welfare. The third article analyzes the
impact of women’s intra-household bargaining power on household fuel choice
decision-making process and further analyzes the determinants of household en-
ergy spending after the decision to use a fuel has been made.
Growing concerns about climate change and environmental degradation has
led many countries to design and implement more sustainable environmental poli-
cies. Although these sustainable policies may improve the current state of the
environment, they could be detrimental to some population groups such as the
poor who rely on natural resources for their livelihoods (Dasgupta and Maler,
1995; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Baumgärtner, 2007; Christophe et al., 2010;
Wunder et al., 2014, Manning et al., 2018). Many of the natural resources do not
have effective regulation, making them prone to over-exploitation and depletion.
The implementation of a rights-based policy through the introduction of private
property use rights (or privatization) is one of the several ways to address the
over-exploitation problem. This policy may or may not be pareto-improving for
the initial resource users.
The first article of this dissertation (co-authored with Martin Quaas) entitled
“Welfare Effects of Natural Resource Privatization: A dynamic analysis” seeks to
understand welfare changes, particularly for the poor, following the introduction
of a rights-based policy. The paper develops a theoretical model that assesses the
distributional and welfare effects on individuals when there is an equal distribu-
tion of private use rights on an open access resource. In contrast to the previous
literature that mostly considers static settings, this paper explicitly models re-
source dynamics and the transition from an open access steady state to a new
steady state under private property rights. Furthermore, conditions are derived
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under which privatization leads to better or worse welfare outcomes for initial
resource users.
The results suggest that privatization is not always Pareto improving. Pri-
vatization is found to be welfare-enhancing if the natural resource is sufficiently
productive, if there is easy access to employment opportunities in the non-resource
sector and if there is no discounting. In addition, when the reduction in income
from resource harvesting during the transition to a new equilibrium is accounted
for, privatization is desirable for the poor only for very productive natural re-
sources and low discount rates.
The paper has been presented in several international conferences and bene-
fited from the comments of esteemed colleagues. I contributed substantially to the
paper at all stage of the research process from the design of the research question
to the writing and revising stages. The paper has been published in Environment
and Development Economics (https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X19000342).
The second research article entitled “Welfare Effects of Carbon taxation on
South African Households” provides empirical evidence on how an environmental
policy impacts welfare. South Africa committed to a 45% reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 2025. To achieve these ambitious target, the South African gov-
ernment implemented a new carbon tax policy in June 2019. The policy imposes
a tax of R120 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent of greenhouse gas emissions.
The second paper seeks to answer the question, how would the newly imple-
mented carbon tax policy in South Africa affect consumers’ welfare? The costs and
burden resulting from the tax would be different across income groups. Hence,
it is essential to understand the distributional effects of the carbon tax policy.
Using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand model (Banks et al., 1997) and house-
hold survey data, the study predicts welfare losses resulting from the tax policy.
The study also analyses income groups with different expenditure shares and uses
elasticities to determine how households would respond to energy price changes
that arise from the introduction of carbon tax.
The study’s findings have relevant policy implications. I find that an increase
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in electricity and public transport prices resulting from the implementation of the
carbon tax policy is regressive, while an increase in motor fuel prices is progres-
sive. In addition, the simultaneous price increases for both electricity, motor fuels
and public transport lead to a higher welfare loss for the poorest and middle in-
come households compared to the richest households. This imply that low-income
households would experience larger tax burdens that would further decrease their
meagre disposable income. Thus, complementary policies such as tax revenue
transfers to low-income households would be helpful in offsetting the welfare loss.
This article is single-authored. It was presented at the 2019 IAEE annual
conference and several research seminars. I acknowledge the helpful comments
I received from Martin Quaas and other esteemed colleagues to improve the
manuscript. The paper is forthcoming in Energy Economics (https://doi.org/10.10
16/j.eneco.2020.104903).
While the first two articles of this dissertation contribute to the literature
on welfare effects of environmental policies, the third article contributes to the
household fuel choice literature. Household air pollution is one of the major causes
of premature deaths in developing countries. This results from household reliance
on solid fuels (e.g wood, crop wastes, animal dung) and the use of inefficient
stoves which produce high levels of health-damaging pollutants. Exposure to
these pollutants is particularly high among women and children in developing
countries who are responsible for household cooking. The adoption of improved
cooking technologies depends on household decision making, and particularly how
women’s preferences, opportunity cost of time and well-being are reflected in the
decision-making process.
In the light of this, the third article entitled, “Gender, Energy Expenditure and
Household Cooking Fuel Choice in Nigeria” focuses on the impact of women intra-
household bargaining power in household fuel choice decision-making process. It
provides a better understanding of the need for women’s participation in the
household decision-making process to mitigate adverse health impacts of indoor
air pollution. It also goes further to analyze the determinants of household energy
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expenditure conditional on fuel use. The study uses a nationally representative
dataset from Nigeria and employs the multinomial logit and log linear regression
models for the analysis.
My findings have three important policy implications for energy transition
in developing countries. First, I do not find significant effects to conclude that
households with female heads are less likely to choose traditional fuels and more
likely to opt for modern fuels as their main cooking fuel. This implies that gender
does not significantly influence the adoption of modern fuels in Nigeria. Second,
income and education are important determinants of household modern energy
use and expenditure. Thus, investments in education would positively influence
the uptake of modern fuels. Third, access to electricity does not guarantee the
use of electricity for cooking. This is probably because public power supply in
Nigeria is intermittent and unreliable. The reliability of electricity supply is a key
component of determining whether or not households use electricity for cooking.
This article is also single-authored. It has been presented at the iDiv Bio-
diversity Economics Group Retreat. I acknowledge the discussions I had and
suggestions I received from Martin Quaas to improve the overall quality of the
manuscript. This paper has undergone the first review process and is to be re-
vised and resubmitted to The Energy Journal (Manuscript Reference Number:
EJ 20-083).
Overall, the dissertation emphasizes that the welfare and distributional im-
pacts of environmental policies should be fully accounted for during the policy
design phase. While poorly designed environmental policies could decrease the
welfare of vulnerable groups in the economy and intensify inequality problems,
policies that accommodate such potential outcomes are more likely to achieve
sustainable growth without harming welfare or worsening inequality.
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Abstract
This paper sets up a dynamic model to study the distributive effects of privatiz-
ing an open access resource.We show that with or without discounting, privatization
is not always Pareto improving. We further derive conditions under which the poor
are made worse off when private use rights are equally distributed compared to situ-
ation with open access resource. These conditions imply that privatization is Pareto
improving if the natural resource is sufficiently productive, inequality in alternative
private project opportunities is low, and if there is no discounting. In addition, we
show that once reduction in income from resource harvesting during the transition
to a new steady state is accounted for, privatization is desirable for the poor only
for very productive natural resources and low discount rates.
JEL codes: Q20, Q52, O13
Keywords: Common pool resource, income, privatization, welfare
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1 Introduction
A majority of the world’s poor rely on open access resources such as fisheries,
forests and lands to meet their basic needs. These natural resources play a vital
role for economic development as they contribute to people’s livelihoods. Several
economic and natural resource studies have emphasized the importance of these
resources in serving as safety nets for those who cannot find employment else-
where, say in the service or manufacturing sectors (Dasgupta and Maler, 1995;
Baland and Platteau, 1996; Baumgärtner, 2007; Delacote, 2007; Bene et al., 2010;
Wunder et al., 2014, Manning et al., 2018). However, many of these resources do
not have enforced property rights or effective regulation, making them prone to
resource overuse, overexploitation and depletion, with negative repercussions on
the harvesters’ incomes (Stavins, 2011; Costello et al., 2012; Noack et al., 2018).
These negative consequences, including the problem of rent dissipation, render
the open access regime inefficient, thereby creating a need for action.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways to address the problem of resource
overuse under open access conditions. One option is to introduce an authority
that is responsible for controlling resource use and harvesting behavior. This au-
thority could be the government or a common property institution developed by
the resource users. Research on common property management has been widely
studied (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; Gebremedhin et al., 2003). A second op-
tion is privatization, which entails the distribution of resource ownership rights
among individuals. Each individual has an exclusive right over his/her resource
allocation (Demsetz, 1967; Smith, 1981; Birdyshaw and Ellis, 2007).
In this paper, we focus on the second approach, privatization. Several resource
economists favor privatization of access to natural resource, mostly on the basis
that it improves overall economic efficiency (Grafton et al., 2005; Grafton et al.,
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2007; Grainger and Parker, 2013; Grainger and Costello, 2014). Privatization re-
sults in an efficiency improvement, as private resource users have an incentive to
restrict harvesting effort, and as harvesting restrictions increase future resource
productivity. Despite these overall efficiency gains, privatization does not neces-
sarily imply a Pareto improvement over an open-access regime. Rather, whether
an individual benefits or loses from a shift in the property right regime from open
access to privatization depends on the distribution of resource-use rights.
Typical approaches to distribute resource use rights are grandfathering or an
equal distribution of rights. We focus on the scenario of equal distribution of
private rights where the individual share of resource rents may not necessarily be
sufficient to compensate for the lost opportunity to generate income in resource
harvesting. This would be especially the case for the poor, who particularly benefit
from free access to the resource. We, therefore, study the question, ’Under which
conditions would privatization with an equal distribution of use rights increase or
decrease the welfare of the poor?’
Previous literature has investigated the distributive and welfare impacts of
privatizing an open access resource mostly in a static setting. Weitzman (1974)
and Samuelson (1974) laid the foundation for this line of research. They developed
theoretical models to compare the allocation of resources under open access and
private property ownership equilibria and argue that labor is always better off
in an equilibrium with inefficient open access rights than in the efficient private
property ownership equilibrium.This result follows from their theoretical set up
where the main inefficiency in the open-access regime is the inefficiently high labor
(effort) use compared to the private property regime. de Meza and Gould (1987)
consider a different model of resource use and find that workers may be better
off in the privatization regime compared to open access. This result is also based
on their theoretical model set up where depletion of resource productivity is the
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main inefficiency in the open-access regime.
Baland and Francois (2005) analyze the welfare impacts of privatizing a com-
mon resource when individuals differ with regards to their income possibilities
outside resource use. They show that although privatization could be a worthy
solution to resource overuse, common insurance dominates privatization with in-
surance when markets are incomplete. Only few papers study the distributional
effects of privatization in a dynamic framework. Baland and Bjorvatn (2013)
argue that even if traditional users of open access resources are restricted from
owning the resource, they may gain from privatization. Considering a harvesting
technology with stock-independent harvesting costs, they show that employment
falls in the short run but rises in the long run. The long-run effect dominates
leading to an increase in both labor incomes and total employment, thereby ben-
efiting initial resource users. Quaas et al. (2018) show for the case of Baltic cod
fishery that the distributional impacts of more efficient management depend on
the initial size of the resource stock. Grainger and Costello (2016) show that espe-
cially the most efficient fishermen would oppose the transition to a property-rights
fishery unless a sufficiently large share of harvesting rights is allocated by means
of grandfathering.
In this paper, we study a dynamic model to assess the distributive and welfare
effects of individuals when an open access resource is equitably privatized. We de-
rive conditions under which privatization leads to better or worse welfare outcomes
for initial resource users. First, we show that privatization reduces labor alloca-
tion on the resource and therefore increases stock level. Thus, the steady state
resource stock is greater in a privatization regime than in an open-access regime.
Next, we compare steady states incomes in the open-access and the privatization
regimes with and without discounting and derive conditions under which steady
state incomes of the poor are higher in the open-access regime. For the case with
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a positive discount rate, we further consider transition dynamics from the open
access steady state to the privatization steady state and show that this transition
period will in particular harm the poor resource users. We use numerical examples
to illustrate our analytical results.
This paper comprises of four sections. Section 2 presents the model framework
in both the open-access and privatization regimes. Section 3 analyses the steady
state equilibrium, compares incomes from the two different regimes and provides
the transitional dynamics of the model. Lastly, section 4 discusses and concludes
the paper.
2 A Dynamic Model of Regime Change with
Open Access Resources
We consider a small economy with a continuum of individuals with a total mass
of one. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor and chooses to work
either in resource harvesting or in private project (a resource-independent sec-
tor). Returns from the private project differ across individuals, but are constant
for each individual. The resource is harvested by means of a technology that
uses the resource and labor as inputs, and is available to all individuals in the
economy. Access to the resource is free for all in the open-access regime. In the
privatization regime, resource-harvesting individuals need use rights, using their
own endowment of these private rights and/or rented use rights from other own-
ers. Returns in resource harvesting depend on the resource stock x which changes
over time depending on natural regeneration and harvesting. However, since re-
source harvesting is competitive, all individuals in resource harvesting receive the
same return, equal to the value of the marginal product of resource harvesting.
Given these assumptions, every individual will specialize and work with his/her
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full amount of time (one unit) in either resource harvesting or the private project.
In the open-access regime, all those individuals whose return in the private
project is not more than the current value of the marginal product of resource
harvesting will work in resource harvesting. All these ‘poor’ individuals benefit
from free access to the resource, as they receive the value of the marginal product of
the resource instead of the lower return from their private project. All individuals
with a private project return greater than θO, the value of the marginal product
in resource harvesting, choose to work on private project. Their income is higher
in proportion to the return of their private project. All individuals with a return
from private project equal or below θO choose to work in resource harvesting and
thus all receive the same income θO of resource harvesting.
In the privatization regime, resource use rights are equally distributed across
individuals. Only those individuals whose return from the private project, plus
the rental price of the use right, is not more than the current value of the marginal
product of resource harvesting will work in resource harvesting. The ‘cutoff’ level
of productivity in the private project, θP , is lower in the privatization regime
than in the open-access regime, since the rent for the use right of the resource
is positive. Thus, fewer individuals will harvest the resource in the privatization
regime compared to the open-access regime, and their individual income from
resource harvesting will be lower. Yet, all individuals will also receive their share
of the resource rent, R. This is an extra benefit for those individuals who did
not work in resource harvesting even in the open-access regime. For the initial
resource users - the poor - the extra income in form of resource rents may or may
not be sufficient to compensate for the loss of income from resource harvesting.
The question is thus, under which circumstances is the effect of privatization on
the overall incomes of the poor positive or negative. The answer to this question
depends not only on resource dynamics but also on harvesting technology and the
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distribution of private returns. To study this question, we set up the formal model
and derive some preliminary results for the open-access regime scenario and then
turn to the analysis of the privatization regime.
2.1 Model set up and resource use in the open-access
regime
In both regimes, individuals choose how much time they work in resource har-
vesting and how much time they work on a private project. Since each individual
has one unit of labor, and the total mass of individuals is one, the sum of labor
in resource harvesting LO and private projects LP is one,
LO + LP = 1.
Returns from private project, θi, differ across individuals, and are assumed to be
uniformly distributed between a minimum of θ and a maximum of θ̄. The spread
between θ and θ is a measure for the inequality in alternative private project
opportunities.
To simplify expressions, we normalize the minimum return that can be ob-
tained from a private project to zero, θ = 0.1 Thus, θi ∼ U [θ, θ] = U [0, θ] with a
cumulative distribution function (CDF)
F (θ) =
θ − θ
θ − θ
=
θ
θ
. (1)
We model the bio-economic dynamics in a standard fashion. The growth function,
g(x) is a logistic function where r > 0 is the intrinsic growth rate and k > 0 is
1This assumption completely innocuous. As the value or the marginal product in resource
harvesting is always positive, the assumption θ = 0 rules out a corner solution with zero em-
ployment in resource harvesting.
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the environmental carrying capacity,
g(x) = r x
(
1− x
k
)
. (2)
The harvesting productivity q(x) is linear in x, and labor is the only variable
factor in harvesting, such that total harvest is given by
h = q(x)LO = q xLO (3)
with q > 0. Normalizing the price of the resource good to one, the value of
the marginal return of labor in resource harvesting is constant and equal to q x.
In equilibrium, resource harvesting will be the preferred occupation for all those
individuals whose return from the private project does not exceed the return of
labor in resource harvesting. The marginal employee in resource harvesting is
indifferent between earning this return of labor in resource harvesting to receiving
the returns from the private project. This individual’s return from working on
the open access resource, θO, is defined by the equation
θO = q x. (4)
All individuals i with θi ≤ θO choose to work in resource harvesting. Their share
in the total labor force equals
∫ θO
0
f(θi) dθi = F (θ
O)
(4)
= F (q x), (5)
such that total harvest is
h = q xF (q x). (6)
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Since individuals work in either resource harvesting or private project, their
income is defined by the return of labor in resource harvesting, q x, or by the
return from private project, θi. The income of an individual i depends on the
return θi from private project as
yO(θi) =



q xO for θi ≤ θO
θi for θi > θ
O.
(7)
The resource grows over time with dynamics given by the difference between
natural growth g(x) and aggregate harvest h, given by (6),
ẋ = r x
(
1− x
k
)
− q xF (q x). (8)
By setting ẋ = 0, and solving the equation, we derive the steady-state resource
stock under open access (see appendix A) as
xO =
θ r k
k q2 + θ r
. (9)
The steady state resource stock is a function of the upper bound of returns from
working on a private project, carrying capacity, the intrinsic growth rate and
the harvest productivity. The steady-state incomes are obtained by inserting (9)
into (7).
The steady state stock in the open-access regime is always positive, i.e. there is
no resource collapse. This is because both the marginal productivity of labor (cf.
equation 3 and the amount of labor employed in resource harvesting (equation 5)
are linear in the resource stock. Thus, harvest is quadratic in stock size, whereas
growth g(x) is linear in stock size at sufficiently small stock sizes. As a result, net
growth is always positive for very small stock sizes, and thus, a zero stock size is
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ruled out as a steady state outcome.
2.2 Model set up and resource use in the privatization
regime
In the privatization regime, resource harvesting individuals require use rights to
work on the open access resource. This could be their own endowment of private
use rights and/or rented use rights from other owners. Using ρ to denote the rental
price of the right to harvest one unit of the resource and given the normalization
that the price of the resource good is one, the value of the marginal product of
labor in resource harvesting is
θP = (1− ρ) q x, (10)
and the amount of labor in resource harvesting is LP = F (θP ), analogous to the
case in the open-access regime.
Owners of private resource use rights choose the supply of harvest so as to
maximize the present value, at discount rate δ, of revenues from renting out the
quantity q xLP of resource-use rights at a price ρ, ρ q xLP , subject to the resource
dynamics of the stock. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between harvest
and labor input into harvesting, cf. (3), we can equivalently state the resource-
owners problem as an optimization over the time path of LP . From (10) we obtain
the rental value of resource-use rights as ρ q xLP =
(
q x− θP
)
LP . Thus, supply
of use rights over time is determined by the solution of
max
{LP }∞0
∫ ∞
0
e−δ t
(
q x− θP
)
LP dt subject to ẋ = g(x)− q xLP . (11)
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The current-value Hamiltonian for the optimization problem is given by:
H =
(
q x− θP
)
LP + µ
(
g(x)− q xLP
)
(12)
The Hamiltonian includes the labor use, LP , the state variable x, and the associ-
ated co-state variable µ. The first order conditions are given as
∂H
∂LP
= (1− µ) q x− θP = 0 (13a)
∂H
∂x
= q′(x)LP + µ
(
g′(x)− q′(x)LP
)
= δ µ− µ̇ (13b)
∂H
∂µ
= g(x)− q(x)LP = ẋ (13c)
with transversality condition limT→∞ µx = 0. As discussed above, the amount of
labor in resource harvesting is given by LP = F (θP ).
Equating Condition (13a) for the optimal supply of use rights with Condi-
tion (10) for the labor demand by resource harvesting we find the following result.
Lemma 1. The rental price of resource-use rights is just equal to the shadow price
of the resource stock, ρ = µ.
The total revenues of renting out resource-use rights are ρ q xLP = ρ q x θP .
Under an equal distribution of private rights, every individual gets the same share,
which is numerically equal to ρ q x θP , since we normalized the mass of individuals
to one. Under privatization with an equal distribution of resource use rights the
incomes thus are:
θP + µ q xF (θP ) for individuals i with θi ≤ θP = (1− µ) q x (14a)
θi + µ q xF (θ
P ) for individuals i with θi > θ
P . (14b)
Incomes under the privatization regime are defined by the sum of the return
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obtained from working on the common resource and the resource rents. Incomes
change over time, as µ, θP , and x change in the transition towards the privatization
steady state. The steady state values for resource stock size, rents and incomes
in the privatization regime are derived in Appendix B.
3 Welfare effects of privatizing an open access
resource
Our main interest is to compare incomes – especially of the poor resource users
– in the open-access and privatization regimes. We proceed in three steps. First,
we compare steady state incomes without discounting. This corresponds to the
static setting considered by most of the literature, albeit we derive it from a
dynamic model. Second, we compare incomes in the steady state with discounting.
Finally, we include the effect of transition dynamics from an initial steady state
in the open-access regime to the new steady state in the privatization regime with
discounting.
3.1 Distributive effects of privatization without discount-
ing
For the case of no discounting, it is sufficient to compare steady state incomes.
These are determined by the steady-state stock sizes
xO = k
θ r
k q2 + θ r
xP = k
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
. (15)
In Appendix B, we show that steady state stock sizes are positive and less than
carrying capacities, and in Appendix C we show that the steady state stock size
in the privatization regime is larger than in the open-access regime, xP > xO.
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This is attributed to the open access feature of the resource which allows free
entry/harvesting on the resource. It is expected that the equilibrium resource
stock would be lower in an open-access regime compared to a privatization regime
because of the tendency for the open access resource to be overexploited and
overused.
Steady state incomes in the open-access and in the privatization regimes are
given by
θO =
θ r q k
q2 k + θ r
θP +R =
θ r q k
2 q2 k + θ r
+
r q4 k3
(2 q2 k + θ r)2
(16)
where R is the resource rent, which we derive in Appendix D.
We find that θO > θP , but also R > 0. This result is plausible because labor
allocation in the open-access regime is greater than in the privatization regime,
thus, the returns from working on the resource in the open-access regime would
be greater than in the privatization regime. This is also in line with Grainger
and Costello (2016) who noted that the introduction of property rights effectively
levels the playing field across all resource owners by transferring some of the
inframarginal rent to resource rent. One of the aims of privatization is to solve
the problem of resource overuse and depletion. To achieve this, labor allocated
on the resource is reduced. However, resource rents may more than compensate
for this loss.
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Figure 1: Incomes in the open-access and privatization regime.
In the left panel, the incomes of the poor in the privatization regime are less than
in the open-access regime, θP + R < θO (model parameters values are q = r =
k = θ = 1). The opposite is the case in the right panel, where θP +R > θO (same
model parameter values, except q = k = 2).
Possible relationships between the incomes in the open-access and privatization
regime are illustrated in Figure 1. The left panel in this figure shows a case where
the poor – in particular those with productivity of the private project below θP
– are worse off in the privatization regime. The rich, of course, are better off, as
they receive the resource rent in addition to the return from their private projects.
The right panel shows a case where privatization is a strict Pareto improvement.
All individuals are better off in the privatization regime.
The following proposition derives the condition under which privatization with
an equal distribution of resource use rights is (or is not) Pareto improving com-
pared to the open-access regime.
Proposition 1. Assuming discount rate is zero, δ = 0, incomes of the poor are
lower / equal / higher in the privatization regime compared to the open-access
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regime according to
θP +R S θO ⇔ θ
P
θO
=
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
S θ
q k
. (17)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that the left-hand side of the condition in (17) is always smaller than one.
Given Proposition 1, we thus have three possible outcomes. Firstly, if θ > q k,
always θP +R < θO, no matter what the exact values of r, k, q, and θ are. Some
poor people are worse off with privatization when the highest possible return from
the private project, θ, is greater than the maximum harvest in resource harvesting,
q k. As θ is a measure of inequality in alternative private project opportunities,
and q k can be interpreted as a measure of resource productivity, Proposition 1
says that privatization is harmful for the poor if the inequality in private income
opportunities is high relative to resource productivity. Recall that the individuals
who work on private projects are those whose returns are greater than the returns
gotten from working on the commons. In the equitable privatization regime,
where property rights are distributed to all individuals in the economy regardless
of where they originally work, those individuals who relied on resource harvesting
will be made worse off. They no longer have full access to the common resource
and they do not earn any additional returns from outside options. Of course,
those who work on private projects will be better off because, in addition to the
returns gotten from their private projects, they also gain rents from owning the
resource.
Secondly, if q k
2
> θ, always θP + R > θO: all incomes in the privatization
regime are strictly higher than the incomes under open access if the harvest pro-
ductivity at the maximum sustainable yield stock size k/2 is greater than the
highest possible return from private projects. This means that the higher the
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resource productivity, the more beneficial privatization would be. It suggests that
privatization would yield better outcomes when resources have not been overused
or overexploited.
Thirdly, if q k
2
< θ < q k, the relationship between incomes from the privatiza-
tion and open-access regime can be either way. For some sets of parameter values
of r, k, q, and θ, Condition (17) is satisfied, for others it is not.
3.2 Distributive effects of privatization with discounting
Without discounting, i.e. for δ = 0, individuals care only about the long-term
equilibrium outcomes. This is different with discounting, i.e. where δ > 0, as then
the present value of incomes depend on the intertemporal distribution of incomes.
Since we are interested in the effects of privatizing an open access resource, we
take the steady state in the open-access regime as a starting point.
When remaining in the open-access regime, the present value of income of an
individual with return from the private project equal to θ is given by:
PV O =
∫ ∞
0
e−δ t max {θ, θc}d t =
max {θ, θc}
δ
(18)
Since the initial steady state is the open-access regime steady state, income will
stay constant, and the present value is simply the annual income divided by the
discount rate. For the same individual, the present value of income in the priva-
tization regime is given by:
PV P =
∫ ∞
0
e−δ t max {θ, θp(t)}d t+
∫ ∞
0
e−δ t
(
q(x)F (θP (t))−
∫ θP (t)
0
θP (t)F (θP (t))d t
)
(19)
The first term is the present value of income from either resource harvesting – if
θ ≤ θP (t) – or the private project, if θ > θP (t). Note that during the transition
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phase, θP (t) changes over time, so over time there will be a changing mass of
persons working in resource harvesting. The second term is the resource rent,
i.e. the difference between the gross return and the opportunity costs of resource
harvesting. In the privatization regime considered here, each individual gets the
same fraction of resource rent – as we have normalized the mass of individuals to
one, it is numerically equal to the total resource rent.
We proceed with the comparison of incomes in the two regimes in two steps.
First, we compare incomes in the two steady states i.e. the open-access and priva-
tization regimes. In the second step, we include the effect of transition dynamics
(Section 3.3).
Appendix B shows that the steady state resource stock in the privatization
regime with a positive discount rate δ > 0 is given by
xP = k
(q2 k + θ r)(r − δ) +
√
4 (2 q2 k + θ r) θ r2 δ +
(
(q2 k + θ r)(r − δ)
)2
2 (2 q2 k + θ r) r
. (20)
We start our analysis by studying the comparative statics of xP , θP , and R with
respect to the discount rate δ. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. The steady-state stock size and resource rent are monotonically
decreasing with the discount rate δ to the levels of the open-access regime,
d xP
d δ
< 0; lim
δ→∞
xP = xO (21)
dR
d δ
< 0; lim
δ→∞
R = 0 (22)
Thus, as δ →∞ the incomes in the two regimes converges i.e. θP +R = θO.
Proof. See Appendix E
Taking into account the discount rate reveals the relationship between the
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discount rate, resource stock and incomes. The intuition behind this proposition
is straightforward. The steady state resource stock under privatization decreases
with the discount rate. Resource users prefer to harvest more today rather than
in the future. The maximum steady state for the privatization regime is xP with
a discount rate equal to zero. As the discount rate increases, the stock decreases.
In the other extreme, if the discount rate approaches infinity, the stock converges
to the open access steady state which is the initial steady state. This also leads
to the convergence of both steady state incomes.
Similarly, as the discount rate increases, steady state resource rents fall. This
relationship is derived from the negative association between the resource stock
and the discount rate. Higher discount rate implies that resource users have
strong preference for present consumption and a higher willingness to harvest now.
Although harvesting increases during this period,the declining stock requires more
effort than was previously needed to harvest a certain amount of output. It is
also less productive, hence a decrease in the resource rents.
To proceed with the analysis we consider the steady state income in the priva-
tization regime as a function of the steady state resource stock size xP – keeping
in mind that xP , in turn, is a function of parameter values, in particular a func-
tion of the discount rate δ. We find that steady state income in the privatization
regime is a hump-shaped function of steady state stock size xP , as stated in the
following proposition. We also know from Proposition 2 that the actual steady
state stock sizes, considered as a function of δ, lie between a minimum xO – for
δ →∞ – and a maximum x∗ ≡ xP
∣∣
δ=0
. Thus, depending on the other parameter
values, we can have three cases, as characterized in the following proposition. We
will consider all these cases below.
Proposition 3. There exist a maximum x̂ = arg max
(
θP +R
)
when d(θ
P +R)
d xP
= 0.
Given this maximum, we distinguish three cases (using x∗ = xP |δ=0),
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(I) If x̂ < xO, steady-state income monotonically increases with the discount
rate. This case prevails if and only if θ > q k.
(II) If x̂ > x∗, steady-state income monotonically decreases with the discount
rate. This case prevails if and only if θ < q k
(
1− 2 q
r
)
(III) If xO < x̂ < x∗, steady-state income first increases with the discount rate
and then decreases, asymptotically approaching θO for δ → ∞. This case
prevails for q k
(
1− 2 q
r
)
< θ < q k.
Proof. See Appendix F
Note that Case (I) coincides with the case where, without discounting, the poor
is always better off in the open-access regime than in the privatization regime (cf.
Proposition 1). In this case, increasing the discount rate brings the steady state
in the privatization regime closer to the better (open-access) steady state.
Without discounting, the privatization regime is always better than the open-
access regime if θ < q k/2, i.e. if the maximum productivity of the private project
is relatively small. In a similar fashion, the incomes of the poor monotonically
decreases with the discount rate (Case II) if the inequality of private project pro-
ductivities is low, here if θ is below the threshold q k (1− 2 q/r). This threshold is
increasing in resource productivity, measured both in terms of carrying capacity k
and in terms of intrinsic growth rate r. In Case (II), increasing the discount rate
decreases income ultimately towards the lower income in the open-access regime.
The relationship between the steady state incomes of the poor and the discount
rate is non-monotonic, i.e. first increasing and then decreasing (Case III). Note
that the critical value for θ below which the steady state income monotonically
decreases with the discount rate is different from the critical value below which
steady state income with discounting is larger than income in the open-access
regime. Thus it may be that the steady-state income in the privatization regime
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is higher than the steady state income in the open-access regime, no matter the
discount rate. This is the case if q k (1− 2 q/r) < θ < q k, but θ < q k/2. Yet, it is
also possible that for small discount rates, income in the privatization steady state
is below income in the open-access steady state. But with increasing discount rate,
steady state income in the privatization regime would eventually exceed steady
state income in the open-access regime. This is the case if q k (1−2 q/r) < θ < q k,
and q k/2 < θ < q k.
The four-quadrant plots in Figures 2 to 4 illustrate these results. In all three
figures the panel in the top right shows the relationship between the discount rate
and steady state income in the privatization regime. The other three quadrants
illustrate how this is obtained. The panel in the bottom right shows how the steady
state resource stock depends on the discount rate. In all cases, it is monotonically
decreasing from x∗ = xP
∣∣
δ=0
to xO for δ →∞. The graph in the top left quadrant
shows the relationship between steady state resource stock size and steady-state
income. It is always non-monotonic, assuming a maximum at some value x̂. In
Case (I), shown in Figure 2, this maximum is at a stock size smaller than the
steady state stock size in the open-access regime, xO. As a consequence, the
steady state income monotonically increases with the discount rate, ultimately
approaching the open access income from below. Figure 3 illustrates Case (II)
where the steady state income is monotonically decreasing with δ. In this case
the maximum of the curve in the top left panel is at a stock size larger than x∗.
Figure 4 illustrates Case (III) where the steady state first increases and then
decreases with the discount rate. In the case shown in the figure, steady state
income in the privatization regime for zero discounting is larger than income in the
open-access regime. With increasing discount rate, it assumes a maximum even
above this income and then decreases to the income in the open-access regime from
above. Another possibility (not shown) is that the income in the privatization
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regime starts, with zero discount rate, at a level smaller than in the open-access
regime, then exceeds the income in the open-access regime for some value of δ,
and ultimately approaches θO from above.
3.3 Transition Dynamics
We have shown that xP > xO for all finite discount rates δ. Thus, starting in
an open-access regime steady state, privatization always implies a phase of stock
rebuilding with reduced harvesting effort, i.e. θP will be below its steady state
level during the transition towards the steady state. This, of course, imposes
an extra cost on the poor resource harvesters who do not find employment in
resource harvesting during this transition phase. This implies that privatization
reduces the incomes of the poor both in steady state and during transition phase
towards the new steady state even in the case where steady state incomes in the
privatization regime are lower than the incomes in the open-access regime. Thus,
we immediately obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. In Case (I), the present value of income for poor resource har-
vesters is below the present value of income in the open-access regime for any
value of the discount rate δ.
In Cases (II) and (III) there is a critical value for the discount rate δ̂ such that
the present value of income for poor resource users is below the present value of
incomes in the open-access regime for all discount rates above this threshold level,
i.e. for all δ > δ̂. This is because during the beginning of the transition phase,
employment in resource harvesting is always in the privatization regime lower
compared to the open-access regime, due to the necessity of stock rebuilding.
This finding is illustrated using the numerical example shown in Figure 5. The
figure shows the incomes in both the open-access and privatization steady states
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θO
θp +R|δ=0
xO
x∗
0xOx∗
steady-state income θp +R; θO
xp
steady state resource stock xp
discount rate δ
Figure 2: Case (I) when x̂ < xO, i.e. θ > q k, here q = 2.5, θ = 3, r = 1, k = 1.
The quadrant on the upper right shows the relationship of interest: steady state
income in the privatization regime as a function of the discount rate. In this case,
it monotonically increases towards the steady state income in the open-access
regime. The three other quadrants show the logic behind: The lower right graph
shows how the steady state resource stock in the privatization regime decreases
with the discount rate. The graph on the upper left shows how the steady state
income in the privatization regime changes with the steady state stock size. Under
the conditions of Case (I), both x∗ and xO are above the stock size x̂ at which
steady state income peaks.
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θO
θp +R|δ=0
xO
x∗
0xOx∗
steady-state income θp +R; θO
xp
steady state resource stock xp
discount rate δ
Figure 3: Case (II) when x̂ > x∗, i.e. θ < q k (1− 2 q/r) and q = 1.3, θ = 0.2, r =
6, k = 1.
The explanation of the four quadrants is the same as in Figure 2. Note the
difference in the quadrant on the upper left: in Case (II), both x∗ and xO are
below the stock size x̂ at which steady-state income peaks.
and the annuity on income in the privatization regime including the transition
dynamics – i.e., the constant annual income that gives rise to the same present
value as the time-varying income in the privatization regime including transitional
dynamics.
We are considering a parameter set corresponding to Case (II): income in the
privatization regime is above the income in the open-access regime for all values of
the discount rate. This is still true, including transition dynamics, if the discount
rate is sufficiently low. For large enough discount rates, however, the damage done
to the poor resource harvesters in the rebuilding phase becomes so important that
they are worse off in the privatization regime.
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θO
θp +R|δ=0
xO
x∗
0xOx∗
steady-state income θp +R; θO
xp
steady state resource stock xp
discount rate δ
Figure 4: Case (III) when xO < x̂ < x∗ and q = 3, θ = 1, r = 2.
The explanation of the four quadrants is the same as in Figure 2. Note the
difference to the previous cases in the quadrant on the upper left: in Case (III),
x∗ is above, but xO is below the stock size x̂ at which steady-state income peaks.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a dynamic model to study the distributive effects of
privatizing an open access resource, and specifically to derive conditions under
which the poor are made worse off when equally distributed private use rights
are introduced for a renewable natural resource. Our focus was on the incomes
of the poor, as in our setting the rich ones – with a highly productive private
project – are always better off in the privatization regime. While it may seem
contradictory at first glance, our results are in line with the finding of Grainger
and Costello (2016) who show that the most efficient resource users are the ones
mostly against privatization. The poor, in our set up, are the ones with the least
productive outside option. This means, they have a comparative advantage in
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Figure 5: Comparison of incomes in the open-access steady state, privatization
steady state and the annuity on income in the privatization regime including
transition dynamics – i.e., the constant annual income that gives rise to the same
present value as the time-varying income in the privatization regime including
transitional dynamics – for varying discount rates. Other parameter values are
q = 2, θ = 1, r = 1, k = 1.
resource harvesting, as the difference between returns from working in resource
harvesting and opportunity costs (= the value of the outside option) is largest for
them.
We find that with or without discounting, privatization is always Pareto effi-
cient if the steady state stock under the privatization regime is sufficiently large.
This is the case if the spread of productivities of the private projects is small and
if the carrying capacity of the resource is large. This implies that with a produc-
tive resource – in terms of the rate of reproduction – and a more equal society, a
privatization policy would improve all individuals’ welfare.
Furthermore, we have studied the effect of discounting on the comparison of
steady-state incomes in the open-access and privatization regimes. This impact
depends on the technical and biological characteristics of resource harvesting. If
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the natural resource is sufficiently productive, and inequality in alternative private
project opportunities is low, incomes in the privatization regime monotonically
decrease with the discount rate. In that case (referred to as Case II above), a pri-
vatization policy would improve all individuals’ welfare in steady state, no matter
the exact value of the discount rate. If, on the other hand, society is very unequal
in the sense that the spread of private productivities is high relative to the pro-
ductivity of resource harvesting (referred to as Case I above), the reverse is true:
Incomes are higher in the privatization steady state, and the effect becomes more
pronounced the lower the discount rate is. For intermediate resources (referred to
as Case III above), the relationship between the resource and the discount rate
is non-monotonic, and the ranking of steady state welfare in the open-access and
privatization regime depends on the discount rate.
Taking into account the transition from the open-access regime steady state to
the privatization steady state always decreases the attractiveness of privatization
for the poor. This is because during the transition phase, employment in resource
harvesting is reduced to allow the stock to regenerate. We find that even in
cases where the comparison of steady state incomes would favor privatization, the
additional sacrifice during the transition phase makes privatization less attractive.
We have seen that for large discount rates, the present value of incomes in the
open-access regime will always be higher than the present values of incomes in
the privatization regime with an equal distribution of use rights.
As a general conclusion, privatization with an equal allocation of resource use
rights is detrimental for the poor in situations where the resource is not very
productive, inequality in the private economy is high, and discount rates are high.
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Appendix
A Steady state in the open-access regime
To derive the steady state equilibrium stock in the open-access regime, we set ẋ = 0 in
Equation (8), which then can be written as
r θ + k q2
k θ
x2 − r x = 0. (23)
We ignore the trivial solution xO = 0. The positive solution of this quadratic equation
is given in Equation (9).
With regards to equilibrium incomes, all individuals i working in resource harvesting
receive
θO = q xO = q
θ r k
k q2 + θ r
. (24)
while individuals i working on the private project receive θi.
B Steady state in the privatization regime
To derive the steady state equilibrium stock in the privatization regime, we use the
conditions w = θP and LP = F (θP ) = θP /θ for labor-market equilibrium in the first-
order conditions (13) and set the time derivatives equal to zero. This yields
(1− µ) q x = θP (25a)
(1− µ) q θ
P
θ
= µ
(
δ − r
(
1− 2x
k
))
(25b)
r x
(
1− x
k
)
= q x
θP
θ
. (25c)
Using (25a) and (25c) in (25b) and yields
θ r
q2 x
(
1− x
k
)
r
(
1− x
k
)
=
(
1− θ r
q2 x
(
1− x
k
)) (
δ − r
(
1− 2x
k
))
. (26)
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Solving gives the steady-state resource stock in the privatization regime as
xP = k
(q2 k + θ r)(r − δ)±
√
4 (2 q2 k + θ r) θ r2 δ +
(
(q2 k + θ r)(r − δ)
)2
2 (2 q2 k + θ r) r
(27)
For the case without discounting, δ = 0, this simplifies to
xP = k
2 (q2 k + θ r) r
2 (2 q2 k + θ r) r
= k
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
. (28)
Clearly, 0 < xP < k.
C Comparison of steady states without discounting
To prove that xP > xO consider
k
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
>
θ r k
q2 k + θ r
⇔ q
2 k
2 q2 k + θ r
>
θ r(2 q2 k + θ r − q2 k − θ r)
(q2 k + θ r)(2 q2 k + θ r)
⇔ q
2 k
2 q2 k + θ r
>
q2 k
2 q2 k + θ r
× θ r
q2 k + θ r
, (29)
which holds true as θ r
q2 k+θ r
< 1 .
D Proof of Proposition 1
To prove proposition 1, we need to first derive steady-state resource rentR = µ q xP F (θP ),
cf. (14). Substituting the steady state resource stock in the privatization regime and
the corresponding shadow price (see Appendix B) we get
R = µ q xP
θP
θ
=
(
1− θ r
q2 xP
(
1− x
P
k
))
q xP
θP
θ
= θP
(
q k
θ
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
− r
q
2 q2 k + θ r − (q2 k + θ r)
2 q2 k + θ r
)
=
θP
θ
q3 k2
2 q2 k + θ r
=
r q4 k3
(2 q2 k + θ r)2
. (30)
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Using this value of R, we can compare incomes in the open-access regime and the
privatization regime. We have θP +R S θO if and only if
r q k θ
2 q2 k + θ r
+
r q4 k3
(2 q2 k + θ r)2
S θ r q k
q2 k + θ r
(31)
⇔ q5 k3 + q3 k2 θ r S 2 θ q4 k2 + θ2 r q2 k (32)
⇔ θ
P
θO
=
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
S θ
q k
. (33)
E Proof of Proposition 2
To save notation, we define A = q2 k + θ r. Thus,
xP =
k
2
(
2 q2 k + θ r
)
r
(
A(r − δ) +
√
4(A+ q2 k)(A− q2 k)r δ +A2 (r − δ)2
)
(34)
=
k
2
(
2 q2 k + θ r
)
r
(
A(r − δ) +
√
−4 q4 k2 r δ +A2(r + δ)2
)
. (35)
The sign of dx
P
dδ is thus the same as the sign of the derivative of the expression in
brackets,
d
dδ
(
A(r − δ) +
√
−4 q4 k2 r δ +A2(r + δ)2
)
= −A+ −4 q
4 k2 r + 2A2(r + δ)
2
√
−4 q4 k2 r δ +A2(r + δ)2
< 0,
(36)
which is negative, as
−2 q4 k2 r +A2(r + δ) < A
√
−4 q4 k2 r δ +A2(r + δ)2 (37)
⇔ (−2 q4 k r +A2(r + δ))2 < A2(−4 q4 k2 r δ +A2(r + δ)2) (38)
⇔ q2 k < A = q2 k + θ r. (39)
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This proves the first statement. Next, we show that dRdδ < 0. Note that
dR
dδ =
dR
dxP
dxP
dδ ,
and remember
R =
1
(q k)2
r(k − xP )(q2 k xP − θ r(k − xP )) (40)
Thus,
dR
dxP
=
r
(q k)2
(
−(q2 k xP − θ r(k − xP )) + (k − xP )(q2 k + θ r)
)
(41)
=
r
(q k)2
(
θ r k − xP (q2 k + θ r) + (k − xP )(q2 k + θ r)
)
(42)
=
r
(q k)2
(
θ r k + (k − 2xP )(q2 k + θ r)
)
(43)
=
r
(q k)2
(
2(k − xP )(q2 k + θ r)− q2 k2
)
. (44)
The expression above holds for any xP . Note that d2R/dxP
2
< 0. Thus, dR/dxP > 0
for all xP if dR/dxP > 0 for the largest potential value of xP which is xP when δ = 0.
Substituting xP from (15) in (44) we find
dR
dxP
> 2
(
k − k q
2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
)
(q2 k + θ r)− q2 k2 (45)
=
2 q2 k2(q2 k + θ r)− q2 k2(2 q2 k + θ r)
2 q2 k + θ r
(46)
= q2 k2
θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
> 0. (47)
In the limit δ → ∞, we obtain, using the abbreviation ∆ = 1/δ, and applying
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L’Hospital’s rule,
lim
δ→∞
xP =
k
2
(
2 q2 k + θ r
)
r
A

r + lim
∆→0
−1 +
√
−4 q4 k2 r ∆
A2
+ (∆ r + 1)2
∆

 (48)
=
k
2
(
2 q2 k + θ r
)
r
A

r + lim
∆→0
−4 q4 k2 r 1
A2
+ 2 r (∆ r + 1)
2
√
−4 q4 k2 r ∆
A2
+ (∆ r + 1)2

 (49)
=
k
2
(
2 q2 k + θ r
)
r
A
(
r − 2 q4 k2 r 1
A2
+ r
)
(50)
=
k(
2 q2 k + θ r
)
r
2 q2 k r2 θ + r3 θ
2
q2 k + θ r
=
θ r k
q2 k + θ r
= xO (51)
Also,
lim
δ→∞
R =
1
(q k)2
r(k − xO)(q2 k xO − θ r(k − xO)) (52)
=
r
q2 k2
q2 k2
q2 k + θ r
(
θ r q2 k2
q2 k + θ r
− θ r q
2 k2
q2 k + θ r
)
= 0. (53)
F Proof of Proposition 3
The derivative of θP with respect to the steady-state stock size xP is
d θP
d xP
=
d
d xP
θ r(k − xP )
q k
= −θ r
q k
< 0. (54)
The derivative of total steady state income of the poor with respect to the steady-state
stock size is, using (44)
d
d xP
(
θP +R
)
= −θ r
q k
+
r
(q k)2
(
2(k − xP )(q2 k + θ r)− q2 k2
)
(55)
The second derivative is negative,
d2
d x2
(
θP +R
)
= − 2 r
(q k)2
(q2 k + θ r), (56)
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thus we are indeed considering a maximum. Solving d
d xP
(
θP +R
)
= 0, we find
θ q k + q2 k2 = 2(k − xP )(q2 k + θ r) (57)
⇔ xP = k
2
q2 k + θ (2 r − q)
q2 k + θ r
(58)
=
k
2
(
1 + θ
q − r
q2 k + θ r
)
. (59)
Thus, x̂ < xO if and only if
k
2
q2 k + θ (2 r − q)
q2 k + θ r
< k
θ r
q2 k + θ r
(60)
⇔ q2 k + θ (2 r − q) < 2 θ r (61)
⇔ q k < θ. (62)
We further have x̂ > x∗ if and only if
k
2
q2 k + θ (2 r − q)
q2 k + θ r
> k
q2 k + θ r
2 q2 k + θ r
(63)
⇔ (q2 k + θ (2 r − q)) (2 q2 k + θ r) > 2 (q2 k + θ r)2 (64)
⇔ (q2 k + θ r + θ (r − q)) (2 q2 k + θ r) > 2 (q2 k + θ r)2 (65)
⇔ θ (r − q) (2 q2 k + θ r) > (q2 k + θ r) θ r (66)
⇔ (r − q) (2 q2 k + θ r) > (q2 k + θ r) r (67)
⇔ q k r > 2 q2 k + θ r (68)
⇔ θ < q k
(
1− 2 q
r
)
. (69)
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the welfare impacts of carbon taxation on South African
households. Using household survey data for the period 2009 - 2015, I estimate
the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model to obtain elasticities
and use them to simulate consumer responses to price changes resulting from carbon
taxation. Results show that an increase in electricity and public transport prices
following a carbon tax policy is regressive while a price increase in motor fuel is
progressive. In addition, when there is a simultaneous increase in the prices of
energy goods, the poorest and middle income households disproportionately suffer
a higher welfare loss compared to the richest households. Revenue recycling in terms
of lump-sum transfers of the tax revenue to households below the national poverty
lines and the bottom 40% would offset the welfare loss from a carbon tax policy in
South Africa.
JEL codes: D1, H2, I3, Q4
Keywords: Welfare, Carbon Tax Policy, South Africa, Household
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1 Introduction
Many countries are currently transitioning to low-carbon economies with South Africa
at the forefront of this transition among African countries. South Africa committed to
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025 against current
emission levels. To achieve these ambitious targets, the South African government
implemented a new carbon tax policy in June 2019. The policy imposes a tax of R120
per ton carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent of greenhouse gas emissions. Designed to
be implemented in two phases, the first phase of the tax is from 1 June 2019 to 31
December 2022, and the second phase is from 2023 to 2030. The introduction of this
carbon tax begs the question, how would this new tax policy affect consumers’ welfare?
It is crucial to understand the distributional effects of this policy because various income
groups would most likely experience different costs and burden resulting from the carbon
tax.
The goal of this paper is to understand the incidence of a carbon tax policy in
South Africa. I estimate a household demand system using the Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System (QUAIDS) model (Banks et al. 1997) to evaluate the distributional
and welfare impacts of carbon taxation in South Africa. Using South African household
survey data with about 73,000 observations and five expenditure categories – electricity,
motor fuels, public transport, food and other goods – income and price elasticities are
derived. These elasticities are then used to simulate the effects of energy price changes
on South African Households.
This study is the first to provide empirical evidence on the distributional effects
of the newly implemented carbon tax policy in South Africa by using microdata to
predict welfare losses from the policy. In addition, contrary to other existing studies on
South Africa, it uses the QUAIDS model which analyses income groups with different
expenditure shares and uses elasticities to determine how households would respond to
changes resulting from the introduction of a carbon tax. This approach would provide a
detailed representation of the micro level impacts of the new policy on consumer welfare
as opposed to the commonly used CGE model which focuses on the overall macro effect
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on the economy.
I find three main results. First, an increase in electricity and public transportation
prices as a result of the carbon tax policy is regressive. In contrast, an increase in motor
fuel prices is progressive. Second, simultaneous price increases for energy goods lead
to a higher welfare loss for the poorest and middle income households compared to the
richest households. Third, tax revenue redistribution to the poorest households would
attenuate the adverse effects of the carbon tax policy on South African households.
Discussions about the carbon tax implementation in South Africa started when the
2010 Carbon Tax Discussion Paper was published. However, the first Carbon Tax bill
was only published in 2015 for public comments. The aim of the carbon tax is twofold:
first, to enable South Africa achieve its nationally-determined contribution (NDC) com-
mitments with regards to the 2015 Paris Agreement, and second, to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions in line with the National Climate Change Response Policy and National
Development Plan. Quantifying and understanding the impacts of this environmental
policy would provide policymakers with information on how best to implement the tax.
South Africa is a worthy case study because apart from the fact that it is taking
the lead in implementing a carbon pricing policy in Africa, it also accounts for over
35% of Africa’s total emissions, with its per capita CO2 emissions being higher than the
global average. According to the World Resources Institute Climate Analysis Indicator
Tool, South Africa’s greenhouse gas profile is dominated by emissions from the energy
sector. In 2012, energy accounted for 84% of its total emissions. Of the emissions from
the energy sector, 60% were from electricity and heat, 15% from manufacturing and
construction, 12% from transportation, and 12% from other energy subsectors. The
introduction of a carbon tax to mitigate emissions is expected to be followed by an
increase in the prices of energy-related products. Households are likely to experience a
significant impact on their income since energy expenditure is a substantial fraction of
household incomes. Household survey data shows that in 2015, expenditure on housing,
water, electricity, gas and other fuels and transportation accounted for almost 50% of
total annual household consumption expenditure in South Africa.
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Households are heterogeneous in terms of economic, socio-economic, demographic
and physical features. Thus, energy usage patterns differ substantially from one house-
hold to another, especially across income groups (Farrell 2017; Ye et al. 2018). Energy
expenditure among various South African income groups differs significantly (See Fig-
ure 1). Households in the lowest income decile, on average, spend 6% of their income
on electricity compared to the richest households who spend only about 2% of their
income. On the other hand, the richest households spend up to 5% of their income on
the purchase of motor fuels while the share is almost zero for the poorest households.
Hence, it is most likely that the tax burden would be unequal across income groups.
The tax payments of households in different income groups does not only depend on
the increased product prices but also on the expenditure shares of the income group
(Kerkhof et al. 2008).
Figure 1: Average Household Energy Expenditure Shares by Income Deciles
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Note: This figure plots the proportion of annual income spent on electricity and motor fuels by different
South African income deciles in 2015.
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2 Previous Literature
This study is closely related to two strands of literature. The first assesses the impact
of carbon taxation in South Africa. All the existing literature in this area of research
employ the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The authors focused on
different questions but found similar results (van Heerden et al. 2006; Pauw 2007; De-
varajan et al. 2009; Alton et al. 2014; PMR 2016). van Heerden et al. 2006 use a South
African CGE model to find the potential for a double or triple dividend if revenues
from energy- related environmental taxes are recycled to households by reducing ex-
isting taxes. They find a triple dividend – reduced poverty, decreased emissions and
increased economic growth – when any of the simulated environmental taxes is recy-
cled through a reduction in food prices. Pauw 2007 examine the economic impacts of
different mitigation scenarios and find that at levels beyond R75 per ton of CO2, and
despite using the most efficient of the revenue recycling options available, the economic
impact will be negative. Higher levels of taxation would cause a decrease in production
and employment levels. He also find that GDP may fall between a 2% – 7% range for
a R250 tax, and between 9% - 17% for a tax of R750 per ton of CO2.
After evaluating the socioeconomic consequences of carbon taxes, including impli-
cations for economic growth, employment and the distribution of household incomes,
Alton et al. 2014 find similar results with Pauw 2007. They find that relative to a base-
line with free disposal of CO2, constant world prices and no change in trading partner
behavior, the preferred tax scenario reduces national welfare by 1.2% and employment
by 0.6%. Devarajan et al. 2009 focused on the economic costs of the distortions cre-
ated by different taxes applied to mitigate carbon emissions. Their results show that
the welfare costs of achieving substantial reductions in CO2 emissions are quite small
and that welfare losses from a tax on carbon are small regardless of the elasticities of
substitution in production. Although, if the tax revenue is recycled to reduce existing
tax distortions, the net welfare cost becomes negligible.
A more recent study by the World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR
2016) also used a CGE model to analyze the implications of the South African carbon
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tax. This paper is the first and so far only paper to model the actual design features of
the carbon tax that was implemented in South Africa in 2019. The results reveal that the
carbon tax will lead to a decrease in emissions of 13 - 14.5% by 2025 and 26 - 33% by 2035
compared with the baseline emission level. The paper uses macroeconomic aggregates
such as employment, consumption and real wages to proxy the distributional impact of
the tax. However, it does not provide an in-depth understanding of the welfare impacts
of households as a result of the tax. This paper aims to complement this study by
using household data to evaluate direct distributional effects of the newly implemented
carbon tax on households in various income groups. In addition, contrary to other
studies on South Africa which uses the CGE model, my study adopts the QUAIDS
model because it provides a more detailed understanding of the direct effects of carbon
tax on households as compared to the CGE model. Also, since my research question is
focused on a specific sector - households - of the economy, the QUAIDS model is more
appropriate.
The second strand of literature analyses the welfare effects of carbon taxation on
households using the QUAIDS model (West and Williams 2004; Rosas-Flores et al.
2017; Moshiri and Martinez Santillan 2018; Renner et al. 2018). West and Williams
2004 study the distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase on U.S consumers. Their
results show that when revenues are not recycled, a gasoline tax is regressive. However,
using the additional gas tax revenue to fund labor tax cuts makes the policy substantially
less regressive while using the revenue to fund lump-sum transfers actually makes it
progressive. Rosas-Flores et al. 2017 and Renner et al. 2018 use the QUAIDS model
to study the effect of environment taxes on Mexican households. They find that tax
on electricity, gas and transport is regressive while tax on gasoline and motor fuel is
progressive. Unfortunately, the results from these studies cannot be extrapolated to
South Africa given the differences in income and consumption patterns in the countries.
Hence, the need to study the South African case.
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3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Methodology
Demand systems are crucial in assessing the impacts of tax policy reforms. They are
usually consistent with consumer theory and can match patterns of observed consumer
behavior, which allows for welfare analysis. Consumer demand vary significantly across
households in different income groups and demographics. Expenditure on goods can be
either linear or non-linear in total expenditure. Results are biased when a non-linear
expenditure pattern is estimated with a linear demand system (Banks et al. 1997). The
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model allows for non-linearity by
including a quadratic expenditure term that varies with prices. I, therefore employ
the QUAIDS model to predict the welfare losses of carbon taxation on South African
Households.
The QUAIDS model is a rank 3 quadratic logarithmic budget share system. The
rank of a demand system is the space dimension defined by its Engel curves when every
consumer characteristics except income is held constant. The rank shows the maximum
number of linearly independent price function vectors (LaFrance and Pope 2006). The
indirect utility function of the model is given by:
ln V =
{[
ln m− ln a(p)
b(p)
]−1
+ λ(p)
}−1
(1)
where m is the total expenditure.
ln a(p) is the transcendental log function defined by:
ln a(p) = α0 +
n∑
i=1
αi ln pi +
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γi j ln pi ln pj (2)
b(p) is the Cobb-Douglas price aggregator
b(p) =
n∏
i=1
pβii (3)
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λ(p) is a differentiable, homogeneous function of degree zero of log prices
λ(p) =
n∑
i=1
λi ln pi (4)
Applying Roy’s Identity to the indirect utility function (equation 1) gives the ex-
penditure share equation system defined by:
wi = αi +
n∑
j=1
γi j ln pj + βi ln
[
m
a(p)
]
+
λi
b(p)
{
ln
[
m
a(p)
]}2
+ εi (5)
where αi, γi j , βi and λi are parameters to be estimated by the model.
Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and to
ensure that each household maximizes utility, the model imposes three - adding up,
homogeneity and symmetry - restrictions:
(a) Adding up implies that the budget shares sum to one.
n∑
i=1
αi = 1;
n∑
i=1
γi j = 0;
n∑
i=1
βi = 0;
n∑
i=1
λi = 0
(b) Homogeneity of degree zero in prices and total expenditure.
n∑
j=1
γi j = 0
(c) Slutsky symmetry deals with the substitution effect between commodities.
γi j = γj i
Estimates from the demand model is used to compute the demand elasticities.
3.1.1 Demand Elasticities
One of the main advantages of the QUAIDS model is the ability to estimate demand
elasticities which shows how household demand responds to changes in expenditure and
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prices. In order to obtain the model elasticities, µi and µi j are calculated by differenti-
ating the expenditure share equation (5) with respect to lnm and lnpj , respectively:
µi ≡
∂ wi
∂ lnm
= βi +
2λi
b(p)
{
ln
[
m
a(p)
]}
(6)
µi j ≡
∂ wi
∂ ln pj
= γi j − µi
(
αj +
∑
k
γj k ln pk
)
− λi βj
b(p)
{
ln
[
m
a(p)
]}2
(7)
Then, the budget elasticities ei are derived using:
ei =
µi
wi
+ 1 (8)
The uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticities are given by:
eui j =
µi j
wi
− δi j (9)
where δi j is the Kronecker delta.
Lastly, the compensated (Hicksian) price elasticities are derived using the Slutsky
equation. The compensated price elasticities measures the substitution effects of price
changes on the demand for other goods.
eci j = e
u
i j + eiwj (10)
3.1.2 Simulation of Welfare effects
The simulation is used to illustrate welfare impacts on different households due to energy
price changes resulting from carbon taxation. To calculate the welfare impacts, price
changes are simulated for different scenarios, where the price change per good i is given
by:
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∆ pi
p0i
=
p1i − p0i
p0i
(11)
where ∆ pi is the price change on good i, p
0
i is the price before the implementation of
carbon taxes and p1i is the new price resulting from a tax on carbon.
The new price level after the implementation of a carbon tax is:
p1i =
(
1 +
∆ pi
p0i
)
p0i (12)
After obtaining the new prices, they are substituted into the ln a(p) and b(p) equa-
tions and are used to compute predicted budget shares for each household in equation
5. Household demographics and nominal expenditure remain unchanged. The resid-
ual term εi contains unexplained household-specific effects not included in the model
specification.
Next, the first- and second-order approximations to tax and price changes are de-
rived. The first-order approximation shows the marginal effects of these changes but
does not incorporate substitution effects (Feldstein 1972; Stern 1987).
First-order welfare losses are calculated as:
FO =
n∑
i=1
wi
(
∆ pi
p0i
)
(13)
However, the second-order approximation depend on the distribution of substitu-
tion elasticities and can produce improvements in welfare measurements (Banks et al.
(1996)). Second-order welfare losses is based on the second-order Taylor expansion of the
expenditure share function. Following Renner et al. (2018), the estimated coefficients
are used to calculate the second-order approximation to the Compensating Variation
(CV):
CV = FO +
1
2
n∑
1=1
n∑
j=1
wi ei j
(
∆ pi
p0i
)(
∆ pj
p0j
)
(14)
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Finally, I simulate a lump-sum transfer of the tax revenue to the poorest households.
The price change in equation 11 can be interpreted as an ad valorem tax rate, ti such
that the tax payments per household is given by:
T =
n∑
1=1
ti
exp1i
1 + ∆ pi
p0i
(15)
The total tax revenue for the economy is calculated by multiplying equation 15 with
the household weights and summing over the transfer recipients. Then, the total tax
revenue is redistributed in the form of direct cash transfers to households below the
national poverty lines or those in the bottom 40% of the income distribution.
3.2 Data
The South African Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) and the Living Conditions
Survey (LCS) data were used to estimate the demand system. Both surveys use similar
methodology for data collection and are conducted by the South African national statis-
tics service - Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (see table 1 for details). The similarities
between the IES and LCS datasets enabled me to merge them effortlessly into a pooled
cross-sectional dataset for three survey periods, 2009, 2011 and 2015, consisting of a
total of 72845 observations. The data provides a detailed account of household con-
sumption expenditure on households across twelve expenditure areas and disaggregates
that information by both geography and demographics of the household head.
The survey used a combination of the diary and recall methods. Households were re-
quired to record their daily purchases in diaries provided by Stats SA for a period of two
weeks and to answer several questions from the household questionnaire administered
by a Stats SA official over a four-week period. This two-weeks information was used
to compute annualized household expenditures. The surveys also used the Classifica-
tion of Individual Consumption according to Purpose (COICOP) technique to classify
expenditure items.
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Table 1: Description of South African Household Expenditure Surveys (LCS & IES)
LCS 2008/2009 IES 2010/2011 LCS 2014/2015
Sample size 25,075 households 25,328 households 23,380 households
Methodology Diary and recall Diary and recall Diary and recall
Expenditure data
collection
approach
Goods
Acquisition and
payment approaches
Acquisition approach Acquisition approach
Services Payment approach Payment approach Payment approach
Own production Consumption approach Consumption approach Consumption approach
Dates
August 2008 -
September 2009
August 2010 -
September 2011
October 2014 -
October 2015
Response rate 88% 91.6% 84.9%
Classification of
expenditure items
COICOP COICOP COICOP
Source: Statistical Release on Living Conditions of Households in South Africa 2014/2015 (StatSA)
Note: This table shows the comparison among the different household surveys that were used in the
study. Although the 2010/2011 IES survey is different from the LCS, it is very similar in terms of
methodology and the classification of expenditure item. Thus, the three surveys could be merged
without any problems
As mentioned in the introduction, household energy expenditures vary with income
levels. Figure 2 shows that the expenditure share for motor fuels is similar for both
rural and urban households. However, the expenditure shares on electricity and public
transportation vary between rural and urban households. Urban households in the
lower income deciles spend a greater proportion of their budget on electricity and public
transportation compared to rural households in the same income group. The reverse is
true for households in the top 20% of the income distribution.
For the empirical analysis, I focus on three energy goods, electricity, motor fuels and
public transportation, but I also examine the relationship between energy goods and
other non-energy goods. The following variables are used in the analysis: expenditure
on electricity, motor fuels, public transportation, food and other goods; log prices on
electricity, motor fuels, public transportation, food and other goods; age of household
head; province; settlement type and household size.
Expenditure on public transportation includes passenger transport by railway, road,
air, sea and inland waterways, and other purchased transport services. Food expendi-
ture includes expenditure on all food products and non-alcoholic beverages consumed in
South Africa while expenditure on other goods includes all other household consump-
tion products excluding electricity, motorfuels, public transportation and food. The
”expenditure on other goods” variable is very important to fulfill the adding-up restric-
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Figure 2: Average Expenditure Share on Energy Goods by Settlement Type
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Note: This figure shows that rural and urban households have similar expenditure shares on motor
fuels while there are some differences for the expenditure share on electricity, public transportation and
energy goods.
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tion of the QUAIDS model. The expenditure on heating is included among housing
utilities expenditure, so I have not considered it as a separate expenditure category in
this paper.
There are four settlement types in South Africa namely urban formal, urban in-
formal, traditional (tribal) area and rural formal. I grouped these four settlements
accordingly into two categories: Urban (urban formal and urban informal) and Rural
(traditional area and rural formal). Households were grouped into deciles and settle-
ment types (i.e rural and urban areas) to capture heterogeneous welfare effects of the
price changes after the implementation of the carbon tax policy. In addition, I drop
observations where the household head is less than 15 years to avoid potential bias from
invalid observations.
Similar to Moshiri and Aliyev (2017), average consumer price index for the specific
goods (electricity, motor fuels, public transportation, food and other goods) are used as
a proxy for prices since actual prices for the goods are not available. The data is sourced
from Statistics South Africa website. Monthly consumer price index data is provided
for each good, I averaged the monthly data to get annual price data for the years used in
the study. Thus, each good has an annual average price index for each of the nine South
African provinces. Therefore, I assign this average price to all households living in the
province. This means that the price variable is in provincial level. The description of
variables and summary statistics for each survey period are provided in appendix A.
In addition, I used the Stata quaids command for estimating the demand system
equation. This command allows for the specification of demographic variables which
are incorporated into the model using Ray’s method (Ray 1983). The parameters of the
model are estimated by the iterated feasible generalized nonlinear least-squares (ifgnls)
estimation via Stata’s nlsur command with the ifgnls option. In order to avoid a sin-
gular error-covariance matrix, the quaids command automatically omits the last equa-
tion before calling nlsur. The ifgnls estimator is equivalent to the multivariate normal
maximum-likelihood estimator for this class of problems (Poi 2012). Post-estimation
commands allow for the computation of the budget elasticities as well as the computa-
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tion of the compensated and uncompensated price elasticities.
4 Results
The estimated coefficients of the QUAIDS model are reported in Appendix B. Even
though these coefficients have no direct economic interpretation, they are used to cal-
culate the elasticities presented in Table 2 by using the incomes, prices and expenditure
shares of the average household. The budget elasticities for electricity, public transport
and food are less than one which indicate that for the average South African household,
electricity, public transportation and food are necessities. On the contrary, motor fu-
els are seen as luxury goods, given that the budget elasticity is greater than one. In
South Africa, income is an important factor in determining the demand for motor fuel
use when price changes. Although, the budget elasticity for ”other goods” is greater
than one, this does not mean that all other goods are luxury goods. There is no direct
economic interpretation for this variable because it comprises of all sorts of goods and
it is constructed to fulfill the adding-up restrictions for the QUAIDS model.
The statistically significant compensated and uncompensated own-price elasticities
exhibit the expected negative signs. This implies that an increase in the price of an
energy good would result in a decrease in the demand for that good. Additionally, South
African families show an inelastic response to changes in the price of electricity and an
elastic response to motor fuels and public transportation price changes. Cross-price
elasticities between the energy goods - electricity, motor fuels and public transportation
- show positive signs which indicate that the goods are substitutes and the relationship
is symmetric. However, electricity and food are complements, implying that an increase
in electricity prices would, on average, results in a decrease in the demand for food. This
suggests that the average South African household would reduce their food expenditure
to accommodate an electricity price increase.
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Table 2: Demand Elasticities for Average South African Household
Price
Electricity Motor Fuels Pub. Transport Food Other goods
Budget elasticities
0.632 1.769 0.682 0.942 1.095
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Compensated elasticities
Demand Electricity -0.595 0.696 0.859 -1.694 0.734
(0.043) (0.103) (0.037) (0.115) (0.099)
Motor Fuels 1.261 -1.232 0.092 -9.978 9.857
(0.186) (0.499) (0.133) (0.468) (0.372)
Pub. Transport 0.576 0.035 -1.496 2.368 -1.483
(0.025) (0.049) (0.065) (0.118) (0.114)
Food -0.168 -0.545 0.349 0.060 0.305
(0.011) (0.026) (0.017) (0.070) (0.062)
Other goods 0.071 0.518 -0.210 0.293 -0.672
(0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.060) (0.058)
Uncompensated elasticities
Demand Electricity -0.622 0.682 0.819 -1.964 0.454
(0.043) (0.103) (0.037) (0.115) (0.099)
Motor Fuels 1.186 -1.273 -0.019 -10.734 9.071
(0.186) (0.499) (0.133) (0.468) (0.372)
Pub. Transport 0.547 0.019 -1.539 2.077 -1.786
(0.025) (0.049) (0.065) (0.118) (0.114)
Food -0.208 -0.568 0.289 -0.342 -0.114
(0.011) (0.026) (0.017) (0.070) (0.062)
Other goods 0.024 0.492 -0.279 -0.175 -1.158
(0.009) (0.020) (0.016) (0.059) (0.058)
Standard errors in parentheses
Note: This table shows the budget, compensated and uncompensated elasticities for the goods. Elec-
tricity, public transportation and food are necessities while motor fuels is seen as a luxury good by the
average South African Household
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Welfare Analysis
Stylized energy price changes of 5%, 10% and 20% are simulated to determine con-
sumers’ responses to these changes. For brevity, only the results of the 20% energy
price changes are reported in this paper given that the 5% and 10% price changes have
similar patterns, with only a difference in the magnitude of the welfare losses. This
paper assumes that 20% is the upper bound of potential change in energy prices as a
result of carbon taxation in the short run since the South African government designed
the tax to prevent substantial energy price changes. The reported price change scenar-
ios are therefore: (a) Only electricity prices increase by 20% (b) Only motor fuel prices
increase by 20% (c) Only public transportation prices increase by 20% (d) The prices
of all energy goods - electricity, motor fuel, public transportation - increase by 20%.
Figure 3: Welfare losses from a 20% price increase of electricity and motor fuels
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Note: The left plot shows that a 20% increase in electricity prices is regressive while the right plot shows
that a 20% increase in the price of motor fuels is progressive. The plots also show that the first order
(FO) welfare effects overestimates the welfare loss compared to the second order (CV).
The first and second order welfare effects for electricity, motor fuels, public trans-
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portation and all energy goods price changes are shown in figures 3 and 4. The first
order results overestimate the welfare loss in all the price change scenarios, thereby un-
derscoring the importance of calculating the second order effects. Except for electricity
and public transportation, there is no significant difference between the first and the
second order welfare effects at a 95% confidence interval for a 20% price increase. The
results also show that a 20% increase in electricity and public transport prices is regres-
sive. For instance, households in the lower income deciles lose about 2% while those in
the top 10% of the income distribution lose as low as 0.6%. On the contrary, a change
in motor fuel prices is progressive. The right panel of figure 4 shows a simultaneous
20% increase in electricity, motor fuels and public transport prices. The lowest income
households experience a higher welfare loss of approximately 3.5% compared to a loss
of 2% for the richest households. In addition, the welfare loss from the simultaneous
price increase of all energy goods is higher than the welfare loss from the price increase
of a single energy good.
Figure 4: Welfare losses from 20% price increase in public transportation and energy
goods
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Note: This figure shows that the lowest and middle income deciles suffer higher welfare loss compared
to the highest income deciles from an increase in public transportation and a simultaneous increase in
both electricity, motor fuels and public transport prices.
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Furthermore, considering households’ welfare losses based on settlement type pro-
vides better insights on the effects of energy price changes. Similar to the full sample
results, when the household settlement type is accounted for, electricity and public
transport price changes are regressive while motor fuel price changes is progressive.
However, the degree of welfare loss is not always consistent across income deciles in
rural and urban areas. On average, urban households experience higher welfare loss
from electricity price changes than rural households. This is as a result of high electric-
ity consumption among urban households compared to rural households. Results from
public transportation and simultaneous energy goods price changes reveal that urban
households in the bottom 80% experience a higher welfare loss compared to their rural
counterparts while rural households in the top 20% of the income distribution suffer a
slightly higher welfare loss than urban households in the same income group.
Figure 5: Welfare losses by settlement type
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Note: This figure shows the differences between urban and rural households. The left plot shows that
urban households experience a higher welfare loss than their rural counterparts when electricity price
changes. The right plot shows only a slight differences in the welfare losses between urban and rural
households when the price of motor fuels increases.
64
Figure 6: Welfare losses from energy goods by settlement type
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Note: The figure shows that low and middle income urban households suffer a higher welfare loss
compared to their rural counterparts. On the contrary, high income urban households are slightly
better off than rural high income earners.
Revenue recycling is one of the support policies to be implemented by the South
African government to cushion the adverse effects of the carbon tax policy. Therefore,
I analyze the effect of a lump-sum transfer of the tax revenues to the poorest house-
holds i.e. households in the bottom 40% of the income distribution and those below the
national poverty lines. In 2015, the share of income going to the bottom 40% of house-
holds in South Africa was 8.3% of total income. Hence, the bottom 40% is a worthy
representation of the poorest households in South Africa. In addition, there are three
official poverty lines to capture the different levels of poverty in South Africa. They are
the food poverty line (FPL), the lower-bound poverty line (LBPL) and the upper-bound
poverty lines (UBPL). The FPL is the income threshold below which individuals are
unable to purchase or consume enough food to supply them with the minimum require-
ment for adequate health. Individuals at the LBPL are unable to purchase sufficient
food and nonfood items and are therefore obliged to sacrifice food to obtain essential
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non-food items. While the individuals at the UBPL can purchase both adequate levels
of food and non-food items (StatsSA 2017).
The results of the redistribution policy scenarios are presented in figures 7 and 8 in
Appendix C. The effects of the lump-sum transfer of the tax revenue to the households
below the poverty lines and the bottom 40 are similar. The tax revenue redistribution
to the poorest households yields a progressive outcome. For a 20% change in the prices
of electricity, motor fuels and public transportation, the poorest households experience
up to 20% welfare gains. A simultaneous change in the price of energy goods lead to
welfare gains of up to 90% for the poorest decile.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper investigates the welfare effects of carbon taxation on South African house-
holds in order to provide a deeper understanding of how the newly implemented carbon
tax policy would affect South African households in different income groups. The study
is based on a pooled cross-sectional data from the South African Income and Expendi-
ture Survey and the Living Conditions Survey.
The findings reveal that the welfare loss resulting from an increase in electricity
and public transportation prices is regressive, while it is progressive for motor fuels. A
simultaneous increase in the price of the energy goods considered in this paper shows
that the poorest and middle income households suffer a higher welfare loss than the
richest households. The results also show that the first-order effect overestimates the
welfare loss and that the rural and urban households are affected differently. Other
existing studies also find regressive effects of energy price increase on electricity (Moshiri
and Martinez Santillan 2018; Renner et al. 2018; Schulte and Heindl 2017). However,
contrary to Moshiri and Martinez Santillan (2018) who find regressive welfare effect of
gasoline price increases, this paper finds a progressive effect of an increase in motor fuel
prices. This could be as a result of the difference in the expenditure pattern between
Mexico and South African households.
Although access to electricity in South Africa has risen over the years with national
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access being over 85% of total population, so many poor households have no access to
basic electricity services. To address this problem, the Free Basic Electricity (FBE)
was introduced in 2003, as part of the National Indigent Policy, to provide 50kwh of
electricity per month to poor households. Despite the existence of this program, on
average, poor families spend a high fraction of their budget on electricity compared to
the rich, hence experiencing a higher welfare loss. This implies that the government
needs to monitor the FBE program to ensure that the services are properly targeted
and reach the poor households especially in times of rising electricity prices.
Furthermore, the result for the simultaneous increase in energy prices imply that
direct carbon taxation will disproportionately reduce the welfare of the poorest house-
holds. Low income households would experience larger tax burdens which would further
decrease their already meagre income. Complementary policies such as tax revenue re-
distribution to households below the national poverty lines or the bottom 40 would be
helpful in offsetting the welfare loss.
The distributional effects of the carbon tax are different for rural and urban house-
holds, especially in terms of public transportation price increases. Poor urban house-
holds experience a higher welfare loss from an increase in public transport prices com-
pared to poor rural households. This mainly stems from two reasons, first South Africa
already has a high cost of public transportation in urban areas. Further increasing the
price of public transportation would affect poor urban households negatively. Second,
a high percentage of the rural population do not have access to public transportation
services. 1. The public transport system in South Africa has several challenges including
the increased travel times of especially metropolitan commuters, high transport costs,
limited number of buses and poor roads (StatsSA 2013). Addressing these challenges
would lessen the adverse effects of the expected increase in transport prices that would
result from the carbon tax policy.
This study does not look at the impact of the actual carbon tax because of the
unavailability of CO2 emission intensities data and the environmentally extended input-
1https://www.gov.za/about-sa/transport
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output table for South Africa. Rather, the study is based on the assumption that the
carbon tax would be passed onto consumers in the form of energy price increases. The
results do not hold if this assumption fails. In terms of observable price increases, the
most immediate impact of the implementation of the carbon tax for consumers is the
increase in retail fuel price of 7 cents per litre for petrol and 8 cents per litre for diesel.
Although electricity tariff and taxi transport prices have increased by about 10%, this
has been as a result of the debt crisis suffered by Eskom and the coronavirus pandemic
respectively.
While this study attempts to provide insights on the welfare effects of carbon tax
on South African households, the results should be interpreted with caution. Since the
survey data used a diary and recall method for a two-week time period, the data does
not take into account seasonal changes in household expenditure. Ignoring seasonal
and time effects could bias the model results. Furthermore, the model presented is a
short-run analysis which does not reveal the distributional impacts of the carbon tax
in the long run. Finally, the welfare analysis is based on elasticities from the QUAIDS
model which would be different for dramatic price changes.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Summary Statistics by Survey Period
Table A1: Summary Statistics for 2009
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure in South African Rand
Electricity 24,396 1546.5 3985.5 0 333257
Motor fuel 24,396 1838.5 6918.3 0 597021
Public Transport 24,396 2048.0 4108.2 0 175817
Food 24,396 25182.8 34766.0 0 727994
Other goods 24,396 29580.5 63057.5 190 2352410
Total 24,396 60196.5 93795.2 1191 2593743
Expenditure shares
Electricity 24,396 0.037 0.041 0 0.673
Motor fuel 24,396 0.016 0.045 0 0.929
Public Transport 24,396 0.056 0.066 0 0.913
Food 24,396 0.488 0.175 0 0.964
Other goods 24,396 0.404 0.170 0.019 0.984
Log prices
Electricity 24,396 3.741 0.066 3.601 3.821
Motor fuel 24,396 4.098 0.006 4.087 4.106
Public Transport 24,396 4.134 0.077 3.983 4.224
Food 24,396 4.111 0.019 4.074 4.136
Other goods 24,396 4.194 0.010 4.178 4.206
Other variables
Age of head 24,396 47.640 15.963 15 95
Province 24,396 5.134 2.579 1 9
Settlement type 24,396 2.273 1.483 1 5
Household size 24,396 3.874 2.487 1 26
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for 2011
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure in South African Rand
Electricity 25,076 2038.0 3679.1 0 121026
Motor fuel 25,076 3542.5 7507.2 0 122323
Public Transport 25,076 2792.1 5114.8 0 121413
Food 25,076 26732.7 37140.3 0 835237
Other goods 25,076 42657.9 85723.2 51 3134597
Total 25,076 77763.2 119170.6 219 3615312
Expenditure shares
Electricity 25,076 0.035 0.043 0 0.922
Motor fuel 25,076 0.030 0.070 0 0.805
Public Transport 25,076 0.062 0.087 0 0.844
Food 25,076 0.401 0.174 0 0.980
Other goods 25,076 0.472 0.179 0.015 1.000
Log prices
Electricity 25,076 4.076 0.028 4.023 4.113
Motor fuel 25,076 4.266 0.006 4.254 4.274
Public Transport 25,076 4.187 0.067 4.061 4.262
Food 25,076 4.170 0.019 4.135 4.196
Other goods 25,076 4.279 0.009 4.262 4.289
Other variables
Age of head 25,076 48.14 15.89 15 95
Province 25,076 5.12 2.62 1 9
Settlement type 25,076 2.16 1.47 1 5
Household size 25,076 3.75 2.35 1 21
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Table A3: Summary Statistics for 2015
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure in South African Rand
Electricity 23,373 3050.1 3906.6 0 73105.34
Motor fuel 23,373 3699.2 10446.9 0 348705.9
Public Transport 23,373 3484.5 7243.6 0 474861.8
Food 23,373 29320.6 42570.3 0 1107364
Other goods 23,373 47258.9 94622.6 0 2343466
Total 23,373 86813.3 134617.1 1445.53 2601671
Expenditure shares
Electricity 23,373 0.056 0.056 0 0.791
Motor fuel 23,373 0.024 0.059 0 0.643
Public Transport 23,373 0.071 0.083 0 0.979
Food 23,373 0.392 0.181 0 0.976
Other goods 23,373 0.457 0.181 0 0.991
Log prices
Electricity 23,373 4.460 0.007 4.445 4.469
Motor fuel 23,373 4.585 0.002 4.582 4.588
Public Transport 23,373 4.560 0.033 4.516 4.600
Food 23,373 4.443 0.016 4.422 4.470
Other goods 23,373 4.508 0.008 4.497 4.528
Other variables
Age of head 23,373 49.228 16.103 15 103
Province 23,373 5.109 2.612 1 9
Settlement type 23,373 2.281 1.488 1 5
Household size 23,373 3.803 2.515 1 27
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Appendix B: Estimation Results
Table B1: Demand System Estimation Results
Electricity Motor Fuels Pub. Transport Food Other goods
Constant αi 0.073*** -0.026*** 0.114*** 0.435*** 0.404***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Expenditures βi -0.025*** 0.030*** -0.020*** 0.006** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Electricity price γi1 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.033*** -0.090*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Motorfuels price γi2 -0.007 0.001 -0.243*** 0.219***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009)
Pub. Transport price γi3 -0.036*** 0.122*** -0.121***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Food price γi4 0.268*** -0.058**
(0.030) (0.026)
Other goods price γi5 -0.054**
(0.026)
Expenditure squared λi 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.017*** 0.017***
(.000218) (.000141) (.000233) (.000498) (.000513)
Age of head ηa .000063*** -.000082*** -.000023** .000162*** -.00012***
(4.8e-06) (8.0e-06) (.00001) (.000022) (.000025)
Province ηp -.000473*** .000387*** .000493*** -.00373*** .00333***
(.00003) (.000054) (.000056) (.000156) (.000173)
Settlement type ηs -.000323*** -.00173*** .000886*** .0113*** -.0102***
(.000069) (.0001) (.000122) (.000268) (.0003)
Household size ηh .000204*** -.000644*** .00053*** .00415*** -.00424***
(.000028) (.000048) (.000053) (.000139) (.000143)
No. of Obs 72845 72845 72845 72845 72845
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C: Redistribution policy
Figure 7: Welfare effects with a Lump-sum Transfer to the Bottom 40%
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Source: Author’s calculation
Note: The redistribution of tax revenue to the bottom 40% of the South African population yields a
progressive outcome. For a 20% change in the prices of electricity, motor fuels and public transportation,
the poorest households experience up to 20% welfare gains. A simultaneous change in the price of energy
goods lead to welfare gains of up to 70% for the poorest decile.
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Figure 8: Welfare effects with a Lump-sum Transfer to Households Below the Poverty
Line
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where FPL = Food Poverty Line; LBPL = Lower Bound Poverty Line; UBLP = Upper Bound
Poverty Line.
Note: This figure shows the lump-sum redistribution of tax revenue to household below different poverty
lines. The results are similar to that of the bottom 40%.
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Chapter 4
Gender, Energy Expenditure
and Household Cooking Fuel
Choice in Nigeria
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Gender, Energy Expenditure and Household Cooking
Fuel Choice in Nigeria
This chapter is to be revised and resubmitted to The Energy Journal
Okonkwo, J. (2020) Gender, Energy Expenditure and Household Cooking Fuel
Choice in Nigeria; Manuscript Number:EJ 20-083
Abstract
Using a nationally representative dataset from Nigeria, this article explores the
impact of women’s bargaining power in intra-household decision making process and
further analyzes the determinants of household energy expenditure conditional on
fuel use. The results reinforce the importance of women’s participation in household
fuel choice and energy transition from traditional to modern fuel. In addition to
gender, other household characteristics such as income and education are found to
be important factors which affect household main cooking fuel choice and energy
spending. These findings imply that energy transition policies need to take into
account gender dynamics and women’s preferences.
JEL codes: D12, I3, Q40, O13
Keywords: Women, Fuel Choice, Expenditure, Household
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1 Introduction
Household air pollution is one of the major causes of premature deaths in developing
countries. According to the World Health Organization, about 3 billion people glob-
ally still rely on solid fuels (e.g wood, crop wastes, animal dung) to meet basic energy
needs. The reliance on solid fuels and the use of open fires and inefficient stoves produce
high levels of health-damaging pollutants such as particulate matter, methane, carbon
monoxide and poly-aromatic hydrocarbons. Exposure to these pollutants is particularly
high among women and children in developing countries who are responsible for house-
hold cooking (WHO 2016). This emphasizes the importance of the gender dimension
for household energy transition to modern fuels (e.g. LPG, electricity).
Women and children in developing countries disproportionately suffer from the ad-
verse effects of the use of solid fuels because of several societal and cultural factors.
Gender norms typically assign women and children the role of collecting firewood from
the forests. Firewood collection is time-consuming and requires physical effort for cut-
ting, gathering and transporting the firewood back home. The daily tasks of collecting,
processing and using firewood leave women and children with little to no time for edu-
cation, rest or leisure (Köhlin et al. 2011; WHO 2016). Women in developing countries
usually have lower status than their spouse and so their preferences are not always
accounted for in household decisions. The adoption of improved cooking technologies
depends on household decision making, and particularly the extent to which women’s
preferences, opportunity cost of time and well-being are reflected in the decision-making
process.
Against this backdrop, this paper examines women’s bargaining power in intra-
household decision-making for household fuel choice. In particular, it provides a better
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understanding of the need for women’s participation in the household decision-making
process. Studying this has meaningful policy implications and contributes to the grow-
ing literature on energy and gender. I conjecture that households with female heads are
more likely to adopt modern cooking fuels than those with male heads. This is because
the adoption of modern fuels directly improves the welfare of women in terms of better
health outcomes and reduced cooking time.
The household decision of which fuel to adopt is not the only important aspect of
energy transition from traditional to modern fuels. Understanding the determinants
of household energy spending is also crucial in the design of effective modern energy
transition policies. For instance, households who spend a large fraction of their in-
come on modern fuels will have a lower purchasing power for other consumption goods,
thereby reducing overall welfare. Considering this, this article further investigates the
determinants of household energy expenditure once the decision to use a fuel has been
made. This is also crucial because the factors determining household fuel choice may be
different from those that influence energy spending (Adusah-Poku and Takeuchi 2019).
Moreover, the allocative decision of how to distribute limited energy budget among
different fuel types is important for healthy and productive outcomes for households.
If households spend their income on modern fuels rather than traditional fuels, then
they can enjoy the benefits that accrue from modern fuel usage. Some of these benefits
identified in the literature include improved health, reduced cooking time and more
time for leisure/education and improvements in overall productivity (Köhlin et al. 2011;
Pachauri and Rao 2013; WHO 2016).
Household energy transition is rooted in the energy ladder theory which postulates
that as income increases, households switch from traditional fuels to modern and more
efficient fuels (Hosier and Dowd 1987; Lay et al. 2013; van der Kroon et al. 2013). The
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energy ladder model suggests three fuel switching phases. The first phase involves the
sole use of traditional fuels such as biomass. In the second phase, households move from
the use of traditional to transition fuels such as kerosene and charcoal. In the third
and final phase, households exclusively use modern fuels such as LPG or electricity.
However, different studies have found contrary evidence which reveal that households
in developing countries do not entirely switch to a new phase but use a combination
of fuels simultaneously from different phases of the energy ladder (Masera et al. 2000;
Hanna and Oliva 2015).
Several empirical studies have evaluated the effects of gender on household energy
choice. The existing literature has been conducted in several countries namely Bhutan
(Rahut et al. 2014), Bolivia (Israel 2002), China (An et al. 2002) India (Farsi et al.
2007; Mohapatra and Simon 2017), Sri Lanka (Wickramasinghe 2011), Burkina Faso
(Ouedraogo 2006) and Ghana (Karimu et al. 2016). These studies use already ex-
isting household survey data or conduct their own surveys. In terms of estimation
methodology, the papers employ different approaches to address their research ques-
tions including heckman selection, logit, multinomial logit/probit and ordered probit
models.
The findings from these studies have been contradictory. While some studies find
evidence that female-headed households prefer modern fuels to traditional fuels (Israel
2002; Farsi et al. 2007; Wickramasinghe 2011; Rahut et al. 2014; Karimu et al. 2016;
Mohapatra and Simon 2017), others find that the gender of the household head does
not determine household fuel choice (An et al. 2002; Ouedraogo 2006) which is more
in line with the finding of this paper. The relationship between gender and household
fuel choice is context-specific and depends on geographical variation across countries
(Schunder and Bagchi-Sen 2019). Hence, the results of other studies are not directly
82
applicable to the Nigerian context.
A review of the existing literature on women’s well-being and energy poverty by
Pachauri and Rao (2013) find that more research and empirical evidence is needed
to understand the factors that influence women’s decision making power in terms of
modern energy adoption. Miller and Mobarak (2013) used a randomized controlled
trial to study gender and the intra-household dimension of decision making related to
improved stove adoption. They find that although women have a stronger preference
for improved stoves than men, they do not purchase the stove because of their low
decision-making authority within the household. Using several proxies for women’s
household decision making power, this current study contributes new insights to the
existing studies in this research area.
With regards to fuel expenditure, a review of the existing literature reveal that only
a few papers have tried to study the factors that affect household energy spending in
developing countries (Khandker et al. 2012; Alkon et al. 2016; Mottaleb et al. 2017;
Adusah-Poku and Takeuchi 2019). This study makes two significant contributions to
the existing literature. First, it focuses on Nigeria where a large proportion (70%) of the
population rely on solid fuels as the main energy source of cooking. Since many Nigerian
households are yet to adopt modern cooking fuels, there is a need to understand to
what extent gender influences fuel choice in Nigeria in order to inform energy transition
policies. Therefore, the study provides a nationwide evidence for the Nigerian situation.
Second, unlike most studies in the literature, this paper not only examines the impact
of women intra-household bargaining power, it also studies household energy spending
behavior after they choose a particular fuel.
My findings have several policy implications. First, I do not find significant effects
to conclude that households with female heads are less likely to choose traditional fuels
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and more likely to opt for modern fuels as their main cooking fuel. This implies that
gender does not significantly influence the adoption of modern fuels in Nigeria. Second,
income and education are important determinants of household modern energy use
and expenditure. Thus, investments in education would positively influence the uptake
of modern fuels. Third, access to electricity does not guarantee the use of electricity
for cooking. This is probably because public power supply in Nigeria is intermittent
and unreliable. The reliability of electricity supply is a key component of determining
whether or not households use electricity for cooking.
This paper comprises five sections. Section 2 presents the methodology used in
this study. Section 3 describes the data and discusses household energy use patterns
in Nigeria. Section 4 reports and interprets the estimation results. Lastly, section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
The empirical analysis used in this study is presented in two steps. The first step uses a
discrete choice modeling technique to examine the impact of household characteristics,
most especially women intra-household bargaining power, on fuel choices. The second
step uses a log linear regression approach to understand the factors affecting household
energy expenditure once the decision to use a particular fuel has been made. The idea
for the estimation is derived from the two-part model approach (Cragg 1971). The two-
part model has two equations. The first equation is a probit equation which models
whether or not a household uses a particular fuel while the second equation is a log
linear model to determine the factors affecting energy expenditure for a sub-sample of
households with positive expenditure levels. The sub-sample is used to overcome the
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problem of zero observations which is common in expenditure datasets. Given that
there are multiple cooking fuel options in Nigeria, I use a multinomial model, instead
of the probit model, to determine the probability that a household chooses a given fuel.
2.1 Discrete Choice Model
Households choose among different cooking fuels based on their preferences and charac-
teristics in order to achieve maximum utility. There are various discrete choice models
which are applicable depending on whether the choice set is ordered or unordered. Since
cooking fuel types have no intrinsic ordering, households face an unordered multino-
mial fuel choice. Two models - multinomial logit and multinomial probit - are usually
considered to model unordered choice sets. The multinomial probit model is computa-
tionally burdensome because of the need to evaluate multiple integrals of the normal
distribution (Greene (2018)). Hence, I employ the multinomial logit model which is
both simpler to compute and qualitatively similar to the multinomial probit model.
The multinomial logit model is based on the random utility model. Household i is
faced with m different cooking fuel choices. Suppose the outcome for choosing option
j is given by yi = j and its associated utility is:
Uij = x
′
ij β + εij
where x′ij is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the vector of coefficient parameters
and εij is the unobserved random term.
If household i chooses option j, then it is assumed that Uij yields the maximum
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utility from the different m fuel choices. Thus,
Prob(yi = j) = Prob(Uij > Uil), ∀ l 6= j
The multinomial logit model for household cooking fuel choice is:
Prob(yi = j) =
exp (x′i βj)∑m
k=1 exp (x
′
i βk)
(1)
Since the estimated parameters of the multinomial logit model are generally not
directly interpretable, I compute and report the average marginal effects. For household
i, the average marginal effect of a change in the kth regressor on the probability that
alternative j is the outcome is:
δ pij
δ xik
= pij
(
βj −
m∑
k=1
pik βk
)
= pij(βj − β) (2)
where pij is the probability of adopting alternative j, δ xik measures the impact of a
variation of an explanatory variable xik on the probability of choosing fuel j and β
is a probability weighted average of βk. The marginal effects is computed from the
parameter estimates and vary with the point of evaluation, xik.
2.2 Log Linear Regression Model
I employ a log linear regression model to investigate the determinants of household
energy expenditure once the decision to use a fuel has been made. I use a sub-sample
of the households who already use kerosene and electricity as their main cooking fuel.
Using the sub-sample addresses the problem of zero observations which is common in
expenditure data by focusing on only households with positive kerosene or electricity
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expenditure. Since most of the people who use firewood collect them for free from the
forests, I omit firewood expenditure in this analysis. The regression equation is given
as:
log(ei|Ii > 0) = β0 + βiXi + ui (3)
where ei is kerosene or electricity expenditure. Ii is the indicator for households with
positive kerosene or electricity expenditure. βi is the vector of coefficient estimates and
Xi is a vector of control variables which could influence energy expenditure levels.
Lastly, ui represents the error term. Equation 3 is estimated with the Ordinary Least
Squares Estimator.
3 Data
This paper employs the 2015/2016 Nigerian General Household Survey (NGHS), a com-
prehensive nationally representative household survey. Although, 2015/2016 dataset
contains a sample of 4,581 households, after merging the different data files the full
sample size used for the study analysis reduces to 4,027 households. However, after
model estimation the maximum number of observations is 4000. The NGHS dataset
provides necessary information needed for the analysis. Since the NGHS dataset does
not provide information on prices, electricity prices were gotten from the Nigerian
Electricity Regulatory Commission website and kerosene prices were gotten from an
African Development Bank sponsored database - the Nigerian Data Portal. Fuel prices
are state-specific. Households are assigned a particular fuel price depending on their
state of residence.
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Households in the NGHS survey were asked what their main source of cooking fuel
is. They could choose from several fuel options such as firewood, grass, coal, kerosene,
generator, electricity or gas. Using the typical household fuel classification derived
from the energy ladder, I group the cooking fuels into three categories: Traditional
fuels (firewood, grass), Transition fuels (kerosene, coal, generator) and modern fuels
(LPG and Electricity). This is also the classification used for the dependent variable in
the multinomial analysis with j = 1 for traditional fuels (firewood), j = 2 for transition
fuels (kerosene) and j = 3 for modern fuels (electricity).
Most Nigerian households rely heavily on traditional fuels for cooking. In contrast,
modern fuels are used less often for cooking purposes. Table 1 shows the main energy
sources for cooking in Nigeria. Almost three-quarter of Nigerian households (72%) use
traditional fuels as their main source of cooking and only 23% and 3% use transition and
modern fuels respectively. There are significant differences between the main cooking
fuels used in urban and rural Nigeria. Compared to urban Nigeria where the primary
cooking fuel is kerosene (49%), the predominant cooking fuel among rural households is
firewood (88%). In addition, there are also obvious disparities between female-headed
and male-headed households. About 74% of the male households use firewood for
cooking compared to 63% of the female households. This suggests that households
with female heads are less likely to use traditional fuels than male households.
Although the sample is unbalanced and biased towards firewood use (72%) compared
to other types of fuel use, this is unlikely to bias the model estimates, since the sample
is a representative of the true proportion of the overall Nigerian population and the
multinomial logit regression might be bias in small samples (under about 200) which is
not the case in this study. 1.
1https://eml.berkeley.edu/ mcfadden/discrete/ch2.pdf
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Table 1: Household Energy Consumption Patterns
Cooking Fuels Full Sample Rural Urban Female
Headed
households
Male
headed
households
Traditional
Firewood users (%) 72.0 87.9 38.4 63.1 73.8
average expenditure
(N)
742.0 677.7 880.0 1015.7 695.0
per capita expenditure 210.6 194.3 246.1 588.1 145.3
Transition
Kerosene users (%) 23.0 8.6 48.9 32.4 21.4
average expenditure
(N)
1743.0 1233.6 2842.0 3528.6 1594.7
per capita expenditure 749.6 547.0 1188.9 2091.8 517.4
Modern
Electricity users (%) 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.9
average expenditure
(N)
2801.3 1633.4 5321.1 4533.2 2502.5
per capita expenditure 1155.1 698.8 2144.5 2480.6 925.7
Gas users (%) 3.4 1.5 7.5 3.6 3.4
average expenditure
(N)
549.8 256.0 1183.7 885.5 492.4
per capita expenditure 244.2 106.3 543.2 536.4 193.7
Source: Nigerian General Household Survey 2015/2016
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With regards to energy expenditure, the table indicates that for the national sam-
ple and all sub-samples, households spend the most on electricity compared to other
fuels. Also, urban and female-headed households spend more on fuels than rural and
male-headed households. Table 1 also shows that although a lower proportion of the
female households use traditional fuels as their primary cooking fuel compared to the
households with male heads, their average firewood expenditure is greater than that of
the male-headed households.
3.1 Variables of Interest
One of the objectives of this study is to investigate the gender dimension of house-
hold fuel choice. Thus, the main variable of interest for the multinomial logit model
is women’s intra-household bargaining power. The Nigerian survey data does not pro-
vide information on the person responsible for household consumption decision making,
therefore I use a proxy variable to measure women’s bargaining power in the house-
hold. Given that in most cases the household head is the primary decision maker,
the female-head variable is a natural proxy to measure the decision-making power of
women. Household headship indicates control and power to influence certain household
choices.
Existing evidence suggests that being older than a spouse or more educated is asso-
ciated with a higher relative intra-household bargaining power (Lundberg and Pollak
1994; Lundberg and Pollak 1996; Miller and Mobarak 2013; Schaner 2017). For in-
stance, when a wife is more educated than her husband, she has greater power to
negotiate the adoption of modern fuels. To check the robustness of female bargaining
power, relative spouse education and age variables are also used as proxies. To con-
struct these variables, I divide the spouse’s years of schooling (age) by the husband’s
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for a sub-sample of households with a male head and a female spouse.
The key variables of interest for the log linear regression on fuel expenditure are
household income, fuel prices and gender. These variables are identified in the litera-
ture as important determinants of household energy spending. I used household total
expenditure as a proxy for household income because as documented in the literature,
there is the tendency for households in developing countries to misreport their actual
incomes during surveys. Thus, total expenditure reflects a better measure of long-term
income ( Deaton 1997; An et al. 2002; Edwards and Langpap 2005; Gupta and Köhlin
2006; Akpalu et al. 2011; Muller and Yan 2018; Gould et al. 2020). Household income
and gender are expected to be positively associated with kerosene and electricity ex-
penditure. The fuel price impact could be negative or positive depending on the fuel
type. For example, an increase in the kerosene price is likely to be correlated with a
decrease in kerosene expenditures and an increase in electricity expenditures.
Households tend to use and spend on certain types of fuels depending on their char-
acteristics, location, preferences and wealth status. Considering this, several control
variables such as age of head, household size, home tenancy status, education, connec-
tion to the electricity grid, settlement type and geopolitical zone dummies are included
in the analysis. A description of all variables used in this study are provided in table 4
in the appendix.
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4 Results
4.1 Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Household cooking fuel decisions are analysed using the multinomial logit regression
model. The coefficient estimates are presented in the appendix because they are difficult
to interpret and do not present any economic intuition. Alternatively, the average
marginal effects estimated from the regression are informative. Thus, I report and
explain the average marginal effects shown in table 2. The multinomial logit regression
is estimated using different specifications. Specification (a) is the baseline model which
contains only the main variable of interest in this study, (b) includes other control
variables and (c) contains both control variables and the regional dummies. The signs
on variables with significant marginal effects are the same across all specifications.
The marginal effects of the female-head variable on firewood adoption is negative
and significant which implies that compared to male headed households, female headed
households have a lower probability to choose firewood as their primary cooking fuel.
However, the marginal effect becomes nonsignificant after controlling for household
characteristics and regional dummies. This suggests that the effect of the female-head
variable is overestimated when the control variables are excluded from the analysis.
Nevertheless, the negative effect is in line with my expectation that households with
female heads are less likely to use traditional fuels than households with male heads.
In order to check the robustness of the results, I use alternative proxy variables for
female intra-household bargaining power. In different model specifications, I substi-
tuted the female-head variable with relative spouse education and relative spouse age.
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Table 2: Average Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit for Cooking Fuel
Firewood Kerosene Electricity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
Female -0.096*** -0.396 -0.068 0.097*** 0.264 -0.050 -0.002 0.132 0.117
(0.018) (0.260) (0.249) (0.017) (0.260) (0.251) (0.009) (0.149) (0.147)
Income -0.126*** -0.117*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.049*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Fem*Tot exp 0.032 0.006 -0.022 0.003 -0.011 -0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Kero. Price 0.199*** 0.095*** -0.186*** -0.099*** -0.012 0.004
(0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.020) (0.019)
Elec. Price 0.084 0.053 -0.049 -0.009 -0.035 -0.044
(0.053) (0.061) (0.054) (0.062) (0.027) (0.031)
Age 0.001 0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH size 0.032*** 0.010 -0.050*** -0.031*** 0.018*** 0.021***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Homeowner 0.088*** 0.061*** -0.093*** -0.069*** 0.004 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Basic Education -0.070*** -0.027 0.047** 0.007 0.023 0.020
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Secondary Edu -0.098*** -0.066*** 0.053*** 0.023 0.045*** 0.043**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Tertiary Edu -0.123*** -0.091*** 0.054** 0.025 0.069*** 0.066***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Electricity -0.125*** -0.118*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.017 0.014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Urban -0.166*** -0.113*** 0.157*** 0.111*** 0.009 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Forest Cover -0.003 0.047*** 0.002 -0.040*** 0.001 -0.007**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Geopo. zone NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 4000 3974 3974 4000 3974 3974 4000 3974 3974
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The result tables shown in the appendix are similar to the results obtained when the
female-head variable was used. Furthermore, I performed a multicollinearity test on
the explanatory variables to ensure that they are not collinear. The result presented in
table 14 suggests that there is no multicollinearity among the variables.
Using household per capita expenditure as a proxy for income, I find evidence con-
sistent with the energy ladder theory that an increase in income is associated with
modern fuel adoption. The findings show that households with higher income levels
are less likely to use traditional fuels as their primary cooking fuel and more likely to
use transition and modern fuels. More specifically, a one unit increase in household
income is correlated with a decrease in the probability of choosing firewood by 12%
and an increase in the probability of choosing kerosene and electricity by 7% and 5%
respectively.
Regarding fuel prices, although the electricity price impact is not significant across
all model specifications, the kerosene price has some significant effects on household fuel
choice. Kerosene price has a positive and significant marginal effect on firewood adop-
tion. Households tend to fall back on cheaper traditional fuel sources when kerosene
prices increase. This does not suggest a complete switch away from kerosene to fire-
wood because most households in developing countries use multiple fuels simultane-
ously. Rather it means that households cook more with firewood instead of kerosene.
As expected, an increase in the kerosene price is associated with a reduction in the
probability of households choosing kerosene as their main cooking fuel.
Age, Household size and Home ownership status have similar effects on the house-
hold fuel choice adoption probability. Older household heads are more likely to use
firewood as their main cooking fuel and less likely to use kerosene. Although the effect
of age in explaining household fuel choice is contradictory in the literature with some
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papers finding positive effects (Edwards and Langpap 2005; Démurger and Fournier
2011; Rahut et al. 2014) and others negative effects (Farsi et al. 2007; Özcan et al.
2013), this result is in line with Baiyegunhi and Hassan (2014) who find that in rural
Nigeria, older household heads are more likely to use fuelwood.
Education is one of the key drivers of modern fuel adoption because being educated
exposes one to information on the benefits of using modern fuels and the adverse effects
of using solid fuels. Education also increases the opportunity cost of time for cooking
with solid fuels. The results show that compared to households with uneducated heads,
households with educated heads are less likely to adopt traditional fuels and more likely
to adopt transition and modern fuels. The probability of adoption increases with the
level of education. For example, the probability for household heads with at most basic
education is 2.7% less likely to use firewood as the main cooking fuel. The probability is
9.1% for household heads with tertiary education. This result is similar to other findings
in the literature (Heltberg 2004; Mekonnen and Köhlin 2009; Zhang and Hassen 2017).
The urban variable, access to electricity and proximity to forests show significant
effects on household fuel choice. Households with connection to the electricity grid
and those who live in urban areas are less likely to mainly use firewood for cooking
and more likely to use kerosene. The marginal effects coefficient on electricity is not
significant. This is probably because public power supply in Nigeria is erratic and
unreliable. Being connected to the electricity grid does not guarantee constant power
supply, so it is unlikely that Nigerian households with electricity connection will choose
electricity as their main cooking fuel. In addition, proximity to forest cover is correlated
with a decrease in kerosene or electricity adoption and an increase in firewood usage,
mostly because of the easy access to free firewood from the forests.
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4.2 Log Linear Regression Results
The log linear regression using the OLS estimator was used to analyse the determi-
nants of household energy expenditure conditional on fuel use. Past literature suggests
that income and fuel prices are important determinants of household energy spending.
These variables are used in addition to the gender variable in the baseline model spec-
ification. Table 3 reports the results for the log linear regression on the sub-sample of
households with positive kerosene and electricity expenditure. Similar to table 2, table
3 shows different model specifications and the significant results are consistent across
all specifications.
Female household head and income have a positive and statistically significant rela-
tionship with both kerosene and electricity expenditure once the decision to use these
fuels has been made. This implies that women are more likely to spend on transition
and modern fuels conditional on fuel adoption. The effect of income on kerosene and
electricity expenditure is consistent with the a priori expectation because kerosene and
electricity are normal goods and are also relatively expensive fuels, the amount that is
spent to use them increases with household income.
The effect of household size on kerosene and electricity expenditure is negative and
significant which is contrary to my expectation. Larger households are expected to
spend more on kerosene and electricity because they cook large pots of food and would
require more fuel than a smaller household. However, the result could accrue to the
fact that most large households are relatively poor compared to smaller households and
therefore have lower purchasing power to spend on modern fuels.
All education levels have a positive and significant impact on kerosene expendi-
ture. This implies that being educated increases kerosene expenditure conditional on
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Table 3: Log Linear Regression on Households with Positive Kerosene and Electricity
Expenditure
Kerosene Expenditure Electricity Expenditure
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Female 0.347*** 0.193*** 0.116*** 0.211*** -0.071 -0.077
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Income 0.975*** 0.619*** 0.596*** 0.784*** 0.456*** 0.455***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.027) (0.033) (0.035)
Kero. Price -0.919*** -0.621*** -0.319*** 0.068 0.142* 0.146*
(0.091) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) (0.085) (0.087)
Elec. Price 0.018 0.274* 0.104 -0.415** -0.136 -0.336*
(0.150) (0.142) (0.154) (0.190) (0.182) (0.197)
Age 0.002** -0.001 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HH size -0.490*** -0.439*** -0.542*** -0.521***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035)
Homeowner -0.124*** -0.062* 0.117*** 0.145***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)
Basic Education 0.290*** 0.119*** -0.016 -0.042
(0.039) (0.039) (0.054) (0.054)
Secondary Edu 0.310*** 0.195*** -0.035 -0.065
(0.047) (0.047) (0.058) (0.057)
Tertiary Edu 0.308*** 0.216*** 0.146** 0.107*
(0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.060)
Electricity 0.097*** 0.065** -0.065 -0.060
(0.033) (0.032) (0.069) (0.067)
Urban 0.242*** 0.238*** 0.274*** 0.232***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.039)
Geopo. Zone NO NO YES NO NO YES
Constant 0.567 2.599*** 2.192*** -0.243 2.755*** 3.536***
(0.759) (0.742) (0.753) (0.799) (0.800) (0.883)
R squared 0.480 0.563 0.594 0.317 0.415 0.424
N 2772 2772 2772 2063 2063 2063
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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kerosene use. Although basic and secondary education are not significant for electricity
expenditure, tertiary education is positive and significant. This means that households
with highly educated heads are more likely to spend on electricity that those with
uneducated heads.
The urban variable and access to electricity both have positive and significant effects
on kerosene expenditure. Compared to rural and unconnected households, households
who are connected to the electricity grid and those living in urban areas spend more
on kerosene and electricity.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The relative bargaining power of women in household decision-making is a crucial,
yet overlooked factor in the adoption and sustained use of modern fuels. This article
explores the impact of women’s bargaining power in intra-household decision making
process and further analyzes the determinants of household energy expenditure con-
ditional on fuel use. Understanding these provide insights for policies that encourage
clean fuel adoption. I do not find significant effects to conclude that women’s influ-
ence in household fuel choice is vital for modern fuel adoption. However, the gender
variable is positive and significant for household modern fuel expenditure. In addition,
other household characteristics such as income and education are found to be important
factors which affect both household main cooking fuel choice and energy expenditure.
The results show that among households who use modern fuels, the households
with female heads spend more on these fuels. This implies that households which
have women in charge of decision making use modern fuels more often and therefore
spend more on using the fuels. This also suggests that although gender does not
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influence household energy fuel choice, it influences the amount households spend on
modern fuels. Therefore, energy transition policies should take into account the gender
dynamics in household energy spending behavior.
Education plays a crucial role in household energy transition from traditional to
modern fuels. Education can directly or indirectly influence the uptake of modern
fuels. For instance, investments in education would directly create awareness about the
benefits of modern fuel adoption and promote its uptake. In terms of indirect effects,
education could improve the job prospects of individuals which will in turn increase
income and advance the adoption of modern cooking fuels. Particularly, investing
in women education and development will increase the opportunity and time cost of
cooking with firewood and firewood collection.
The uptake of modern energy can have significant improvements in women’s welfare
and well-being by preventing diseases resulting from indoor air pollution and reducing
cooking time costs. Results show that these improvements can be achieved if policies
are properly designed to improve households’ income and education. In addition, even
though women do not have stronger preference for modern fuels compared to men,
barriers such as poverty could limit the actual adoption of modern fuels. Investment in
programs that improve household access and affordability of clean fuels would increase
usage.
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Appendix
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Variables
N Mean SD Min Max
Log kerosene expenditure 2772 7.28 1.09 1.11 11.06
Log electricity expenditure 2063 8.05 1.00 1.39 12.11
Age 4027 53.27 14.34 18 103
Household Size 4027 5.90 3.28 1 31
Female 4027 0.15 0.35 0 1
Home Ownership 4027 0.75 0.43 0 1
Basic Education 4027 0.25 0.43 0 1
Secondary Education 4027 0.28 0.45 0 1
Tertiary Education 4027 0.16 0.36 0 1
Electricity 4027 0.52 0.50 0 1
Urban 4027 0.32 0.46 0 1
Log income per capita 4027 11.66 0.74 9.43 15.15
Log kerosene prices 4027 5.46 0.19 5.10 6.05
Log electricity prices 4027 3.55 0.10 3.33 3.70
North Central 4027 0.17 0.38 0 1
North East 4027 0.14 0.35 0 1
North West 4027 0.20 0.40 0 1
South East 4027 0.16 0.37 0 1
South South 4027 0.16 0.36 0 1
South West 4027 0.17 0.37 0 1
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Table 4: Description of variables used
Variables Definition
Dependent variables
Multinomial Logit Model
Cooking fuel = 1 if main source of cooking is traditional fuels
= 2 if main source of cooking is transition fuels
= 3 if main source of cooking is modern fuels
Log Linear Regression Model
Kerosene expenditure Log monthly kerosene expenditure in Naira
Electricity expenditure Log monthly electricity expenditure in Naira
Explanatory variables
Age Age of household head
Household size Number of individuals normally living and eating
meals together in the household
Female = 1 if household head is a woman
Home ownership = 1 if home is owned by the household
Basic Education = 1 if household head completed primary school
Secondary Education = 1 if household head completed secondary school
Tertiary Education = 1 if household head completed a higher education
Electricity = 1 if household is connected to the public electricity grid
Urban = 1 if household lives in urban area
Log Income Annual household expenditure per capita in Naira
Log electricity prices Electricity price in the state the household lives in.
Log kerosene prices Kerosene price in the EA the household lives in.
Geopolitical zones dummy variables
North Central = 1 if household lives in North Central geopolitical zone
North East = 1 if household lives in North East geopolitical zone
North West = 1 if household lives in North West geopolitical zone
South East = 1 if household lives in South East geopolitical zone
South West = 1 if household lives in South West geopolitical zone
South South = 1 if household lives in South South geopolitical zone
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for the Female-Headed Households
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Basic education 594 0.257576 0.437668 0 1
Secondary education 594 0.121212 0.326649 0 1
Tertiary education 594 0.102694 0.303814 0 1
Household size 594 3.292929 2.321187 1 16
Kerosene expenditure 594 3346.015 4234.996 0 63875
Electricity expenditure 594 4360.627 7987.096 0 91250
Income 594 221155.4 235291.4 23671.93 3802534
Age 594 60.48316 14.37092 22 100
Urban 594 0.417508 0.493564 0 1
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Table 7: Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Base category: Firewood
Kerosene Electricity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Female 0.563*** 3.588 0.288 0.091 6.593 4.125
(0.099) (2.600) (2.707) (0.236) (5.294) (5.352)
Income 1.109*** 1.115*** 2.318*** 2.392***
(0.115) (0.124) (0.190) (0.203)
Fem*Income -0.293 -0.030 -0.536 -0.340
(0.214) (0.223) (0.420) (0.425)
Kero. Price -2.015*** -1.090*** -1.649** -0.554
(0.347) (0.355) (0.682) (0.666)
Elec. Price -0.734 -0.419 -1.625* -1.750
(0.540) (0.673) (0.944) (1.144)
Age -0.007* -0.015*** -0.001 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
HH size -0.405*** -0.198* 0.364** 0.588***
(0.101) (0.107) (0.177) (0.190)
Homeowner -0.937*** -0.720*** -0.428* -0.182
(0.113) (0.119) (0.222) (0.228)
Basic Education 0.640*** 0.220 1.160** 0.815
(0.163) (0.172) (0.591) (0.598)
Secondary Edu 0.839*** 0.574*** 2.011*** 1.806***
(0.177) (0.188) (0.575) (0.583)
Tertiary Edu 1.000*** 0.764*** 2.910*** 2.713***
(0.193) (0.201) (0.563) (0.569)
Electricity 1.228*** 1.273*** 1.302*** 1.288***
(0.132) (0.139) (0.351) (0.357)
Urban 1.690*** 1.268*** 1.335*** 0.869***
(0.110) (0.122) (0.214) (0.229)
Forest Cover 0.024 -0.500*** 0.045 -0.539***
(0.052) (0.085) (0.094) (0.117)
Geopo. zone No No Yes No No Yes
Constant -1.267*** -1.410 -4.467 -2.941*** -19.827*** -22.975***
(0.042) (2.784) (3.228) (0.088) (4.996) (5.446)
N 4000 3974 3974 4000 3974 3974
Psuedo R2 0.006 0.401 0.438 0.006 0.401 0.438
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit Regression Results (Relative Education)
Base category: Firewood
Kerosene Electricity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Rel. Educ 0.127** 0.045 0.075 -0.082 0.016 0.048
(0.063) (0.087) (0.091) (0.146) (0.182) (0.189)
Income 1.030*** 1.086*** 2.284*** 2.339***
(0.142) (0.154) (0.217) (0.232)
Kero. Price -1.526*** -0.750 -2.083** -0.743
(0.458) (0.471) (0.865) (0.900)
Elec. Price -0.856 -0.611 -1.864 -1.835
(0.720) (0.910) (1.143) (1.431)
Age -0.015** -0.020*** -0.006 -0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
HH size -0.563*** -0.177 0.352 0.806**
(0.177) (0.192) (0.284) (0.316)
Homeowner -1.046*** -0.791*** -0.511* -0.205
(0.152) (0.161) (0.266) (0.275)
Basic Edu -0.178 -0.409* -1.316*** -1.529***
(0.210) (0.224) (0.403) (0.412)
Secondary Edu -0.215 -0.232 -0.903*** -0.946***
(0.181) (0.190) (0.282) (0.291)
Electricity 1.295*** 1.293*** 1.215*** 1.169***
(0.191) (0.200) (0.422) (0.430)
Urban 1.790*** 1.260*** 1.502*** 0.980***
(0.149) (0.170) (0.259) (0.282)
Forest Cover 0.106 -0.454*** 0.136 -0.501***
(0.069) (0.118) (0.113) (0.149)
Geopo. zone No No Yes No No Yes
Constant -0.894*** -1.289 -4.354 -2.216*** -13.222** -18.397***
(0.085) (3.566) (4.273) (0.173) (5.926) (6.653)
N 1780 1763 1763 1780 1763 1763
Psuedo R2 0.002 0.354 0.395 0.002 0.354 0.395
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Multinomial Logit Regression Results (Relative Age)
Base category: Firewood
Kerosene Electricity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Rel. Age 5.952*** 2.800*** 1.743*** 6.271*** 3.287*** 2.143*
(0.484) (0.616) (0.639) (0.975) (1.130) (1.143)
Income 0.950*** 0.939*** 2.303*** 2.338***
(0.128) (0.137) (0.205) (0.220)
Kero. Price -1.494*** -0.776* -1.181 -0.104
(0.394) (0.401) (0.757) (0.768)
Elec. Price -1.028 -0.519 -2.005* -2.118
(0.650) (0.815) (1.092) (1.330)
HH size -0.377** -0.051 0.464* 0.828***
(0.149) (0.160) (0.260) (0.280)
Homeowner -0.975*** -0.792*** -0.569** -0.339
(0.133) (0.141) (0.241) (0.248)
Basic Edu 0.941*** 0.475* 1.066 0.651
(0.237) (0.250) (0.793) (0.798)
Secondary Edu 1.155*** 0.918*** 1.694** 1.457*
(0.233) (0.246) (0.763) (0.767)
Tertiary Edu 1.230*** 1.028*** 2.678*** 2.476***
(0.253) (0.263) (0.752) (0.756)
Electricity 1.371*** 1.374*** 1.143*** 1.056***
(0.168) (0.178) (0.391) (0.399)
Urban 1.802*** 1.393*** 1.508*** 1.097***
(0.133) (0.150) (0.245) (0.263)
Forest Cover 0.092 -0.428*** 0.147 -0.436***
(0.061) (0.103) (0.110) (0.137)
Geopo. zone No No Yes No No Yes
Constant -6.103*** -4.592 -6.761* -7.959*** -23.636*** -25.833***
(0.398) (3.233) (3.755) (0.813) (5.661) (6.180)
N 3087 3065 3065 3087 3065 3065
Psuedo R2 0.053 0.427 0.463 0.053 0.427 0.463
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Average Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit for Cooking Fuel (Relative
Education)
Firewood Kerosene Electricity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
Rel. Educ -0.021 -0.005 -0.008 0.028*** 0.006 0.008 -0.007 -0.001 -0.000
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Income -0.152*** -0.145*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.077***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Kero. Price 0.201*** 0.085* -0.146** -0.073 -0.055 -0.012
(0.055) (0.052) (0.060) (0.059) (0.040) (0.041)
Elec. Price 0.125 0.090 -0.061 -0.022 -0.064 -0.068
(0.087) (0.101) (0.090) (0.105) (0.050) (0.061)
Age 0.002** 0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
HH size 0.053** 0.004 -0.087*** -0.047** 0.034*** 0.043***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014)
Homeowner 0.121*** 0.080*** -0.127*** -0.095*** 0.006 0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012)
Basic Edu 0.043* 0.065*** 0.015 -0.006 -0.058*** -0.060***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018)
Secondary Edu 0.039* 0.038* -0.002 -0.001 -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012)
Electricity -0.160*** -0.145*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.020 0.016
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020)
Urban -0.218*** -0.139*** 0.199*** 0.131*** 0.019* 0.008
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012)
Forest Cover -0.014 0.053*** 0.010 -0.043*** 0.003 -0.010*
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Geopo. zone NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
N 1780 1763 1763 1780 1763 1763 1780 1763 1763
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Average Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit for Cooking Fuel (Relative
Age)
Firewood Kerosene Electricity
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
Rel. Age -1.010*** -0.254*** -0.146*** 0.830*** 0.207*** 0.115** 0.181** 0.047 0.031
(0.071) (0.052) (0.050) (0.068) (0.055) (0.054) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032)
Income -0.100*** -0.092*** 0.049*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Kero. Price 0.129*** 0.056* -0.120*** -0.067* -0.008 0.011
(0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022)
Elec. Price 0.103* 0.060 -0.062 -0.007 -0.041 -0.052
(0.056) (0.065) (0.057) (0.066) (0.030) (0.035)
HH size 0.024* -0.005 -0.044*** -0.020 0.020*** 0.025***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008)
Homeowner 0.082*** 0.059*** -0.082*** -0.064*** 0.001 0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
Basic Edu -0.085*** -0.041** 0.070*** 0.030 0.015 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Secondary Edu -0.109*** -0.081*** 0.079*** 0.055** 0.030 0.026
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Tertiary Edu -0.126*** -0.099*** 0.069*** 0.046* 0.057*** 0.053**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022)
Electricity -0.119*** -0.108*** 0.109*** 0.103*** 0.009 0.006
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Urban -0.156*** -0.110*** 0.144*** 0.104*** 0.013* 0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
Forest Cover -0.009* 0.035*** 0.006 -0.030*** 0.003 -0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Geopo. zone 0.129*** -0.115*** -0.014
N 3087 3065 3065 3087 3065 3065 3087 3065 3065
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Log Linear Regression on Households with Positive Kerosene and Electricity
Expenditure (Relative Education)
Kerosene Expenditure Electricity Expenditure
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Relative Education 0.047** 0.008 0.000 0.052** 0.034 0.044*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
Income 0.798*** 0.569*** 0.538*** 0.732*** 0.466*** 0.473***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.047) (0.037) (0.042) (0.044)
Kero. Price -0.908*** -0.610*** -0.345** 0.101 0.186 0.263**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.132) (0.120) (0.128)
Elec. Price -0.206 0.166 0.071 -0.226 0.077 -0.084
(0.209) (0.202) (0.214) (0.241) (0.233) (0.251)
Age 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HH size -0.606*** -0.543*** -0.581*** -0.528***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.058) (0.062)
Homeowner -0.146*** -0.108** 0.109** 0.140***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.051)
Basic Education 0.038 -0.036 0.021 0.014
(0.053) (0.051) (0.063) (0.062)
Tertiary Education -0.018 0.002 0.191*** 0.176***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.057) (0.057)
Electricity 0.125*** 0.107** 0.029 0.036
(0.048) (0.048) (0.086) (0.085)
Urban 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.344*** 0.284***
(0.043) (0.046) (0.051) (0.054)
Geopo. Zone NO NO YES NO NO YES
Constant 3.436*** 4.103*** 3.495*** -0.578 1.577 1.662
(1.038) (1.041) (1.076) (1.016) (1.004) (1.142)
R squared 0.347 0.442 0.469 0.268 0.361 0.369
N 1351 1351 1351 1133 1133 1133
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Log Linear Regression on Households with Positive Kerosene and Electricity
Expenditure (Relative Age)
Kerosene Expenditure Electricity Expenditure
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Relative Age 1.156*** 0.649*** 0.346** 0.811*** 0.476** 0.342*
(0.163) (0.151) (0.146) (0.190) (0.189) (0.200)
Income 0.912*** 0.622*** 0.581*** 0.715*** 0.461*** 0.455***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.040)
Kero. Price -0.812*** -0.472*** -0.212** 0.077 0.152 0.151
(0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.099) (0.094) (0.096)
Elec. Price 0.100 0.255 0.117 -0.316 -0.131 -0.344
(0.179) (0.169) (0.185) (0.206) (0.201) (0.219)
HH size -0.530*** -0.454*** -0.547*** -0.523***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.050) (0.052)
Homeowner -0.138*** -0.092** 0.182*** 0.204***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043)
Basic Education 0.332*** 0.139*** -0.024 -0.060
(0.049) (0.049) (0.068) (0.067)
Secondary Educ 0.316*** 0.210*** -0.080 -0.111*
(0.052) (0.051) (0.065) (0.064)
Tertiary Education 0.282*** 0.198*** 0.107 0.066
(0.058) (0.057) (0.070) (0.069)
Electricity 0.084** 0.054 -0.036 -0.030
(0.040) (0.039) (0.077) (0.077)
Urban 0.272*** 0.275*** 0.375*** 0.339***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044)
Geopo. Zone NO NO YES NO NO YES
Constant -0.489 1.499* 1.465* -0.515 2.379*** 3.372***
(0.877) (0.827) (0.836) (0.867) (0.870) (0.983)
R squared 0.430 0.517 0.553 0.275 0.369 0.378
N 1999 1999 1999 1525 1525 1525
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Multicollinearity diagnostics
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Female 1.31 0.762923
Income 2.25 0.443885
Kerosene price 1.24 0.804818
Electricity Price 1.61 0.621791
Age 1.28 0.781758
Household size 1.9 0.527692
Homeowner 1.37 0.732305
Basic Education 1.64 0.611518
Secondary Education 1.7 0.588969
Tertiary Education 1.77 0.565017
Electricity Price 1.58 0.63357
Urban 1.53 0.654528
North Central 2.57 0.389738
North West 2.56 0.390835
North East 2.32 0.430177
South South 2.24 0.446791
South East 2.14 0.468303
Mean VIF 1.82
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